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The World Trade Organization (WTO) stands at the center
of an emerging structure of global economic governance. Its
rules affect important aspects of everyone's lives-how much
people pay for the products that they purchase, what types of
employment are open to them, and which medicines they can
access. And yet, while the WTO was conceived as a "negotiating
machine" that would develop rules in sync with an increasingly
dynamic global economy, negotiations on a new set of global
trade rules have now been deadlocked for over a decade. This
impasse is all the more surprising in light of the fact that the
multilateral trade regime was, up until the establishment of the
WTO in 1995, one of the most productive engines of
international lawmaking. The present Article explores why
multilateral trade lawmaking used to work, and why it is no
longer working today.
A key part of the answer is that before the establishment of
the WTO, the multilateral trading system worked as a "club,"
which allowed the major trading powers to manipulate the
circle of participants in trade negotiations depending on how
these powers weighed the costs and benefits of the participation
of additional states. The Article identifies three factors that led
the major trading nations to adopt this approach: (1) the greater
practicality of negotiations among a smaller group of countries,
(2) the insiders' greater influence on the outcome of the
negotiations, and (3) the chance to subsequently compel
outsiders to join the agreement on the insiders' terms. The
Article shows how the major trading powers were able to
implement the club approach to multilateral trade lawmaking
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Settlement Lawyer, Appellate Body Secretariat, World Trade Organization. Earlier
versions of this paper were presented at the ASIL International Economic Law Interest
Group Junior Scholars Research Forum at the University of Pennsylvania Wharton
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throughout he pre-WTO era-an ability that accounts for much
of the legislative dynamism of that time. The Article then argues
that the founding of the WTO, while itself an example of the
successful employment of the club logic, has made the use of the
club approach in the multilateral trading system much more
difficult, if not impracticable. As a result, the pace of
lawmaking in the multilateral trading system is now
circumscribed by the need to seek the support, or at least
acquiescence, of all WTO members.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) stands at the center of an
emerging structure of global economic governance. Its rules affect
important aspects of everyone's lives-how much people pay for the
products that they purchase, what types of employment are open to
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them, and which medicines they can access. And yet, while the WTO
was conceived as a "negotiating machine"1 that would develop rules
in sync with an increasingly dynamic global economy, negotiations on
a new set of global trade rules have now been deadlocked for over a
decade. This impasse is all the more surprising in light of the fact
that the multilateral trade regime was, up until the establishment of
the WTO in 1995, one of the most productive engines of international
lawmaking. The present Article explores why multilateral trade
lawmaking used to work, and why it is no longer working today.
A key part of the answer, the Article suggests, is that before the
establishment of the WTO, the multilateral trading system worked as
a "club." It is not uncommon to see the institutions of the multilateral
trade regime-the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade2 (GATT)
in particular-described as a "club."' 3 Some use this label to evoke the
pragmatism, informality, and insularity that characterized the
GATT. 4 Others employ the concept to highlight the extent to which
many countries, especially developing countries, have historically
been excluded from meaningful participation in trade lawmaking and
1. See PETER SUTHERLAND, ET AL., CONSULTATIVE BOARD, THE FUTURE OF
THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 61
(2004) (describing the World Trade Organization as "in large measure a negotiating
machine" that was "designed to seek negotiated solutions to the challenges of global
trade").
2. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT was a trade agreement
adopted by twenty-three countries in 1947, with the aim of reducing barriers to
international trade. The GATT was originally part of a larger effort to establish
institutions that would govern the international economy in the wake of the Second
World War. In the field of trade, the larger institutional project-the establishment of
an International Trade Organization (ITO)-floundered, and the GATT remained the
main multilateral forum for the governance of international trade during the second
half of the twentieth century, until it was replaced by the WTO in 1995. The
relationship of the GATT to the ITO and its replacement by the WTO will be discussed
in detail in Part III infra.
3. Gerard Curzon & Victoria Curzon, GATT: Traders' Club, in THE ANATOMY
OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 298, 298 (Robert
W. Cox & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1973); Peter-Tobias Stoll, The World Trade
Organization as a Club: Rethinking Reciprocity and Common Interest, in FROM
BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA
172 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011); Robert Wolfe, Canada's Adventures in
Clubland: Trade Clubs and Political Influence, in READINGS IN CANADIAN FOREIGN
POLICY: CLASSIC DEBATES AND NEW IDEAS 377 (Chris Kukucha and Duane Bratt eds.,
2011).
4. See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Club Model of
Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in,
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE
MILLENNIUM 264, 266 (Roger B. Porter at al. eds., 2001) (describing how the "club
model" insulated trade negotiators from officials representing non-trade interests and
from public scrutiny more generally); Brian Hocking, Changing the Terms of Trade
Policy Making: From the 'Club' to the 'Multistakeholder' Model, 3 WORLD TRADE REV. 3
(2004).
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from the benefits of the trade regime.5 However, the concept has
remained more of a political catchphrase than a systematically
developed analytical tool. The present Article takes inspiration from
economic theory to give the club concept more analytical depth and
then employs the refined concept to explore the history, legal
ramifications, and political implications of the club approach to
multilateral trade lawmaking.
Economic theory defines clubs by reference to the characteristics
of the goods that the members of the club share.6 Put simply, a club
good is a good that is best shared with some, but not too many,
others.7 As a consequence, the club members seek to exclude those
whose participation would pose higher costs than benefits.8 To say
that states adopt a club approach to multilateral lawmaking, then, is
to say that they seek to manipulate the circle of participants
depending on how they weigh the costs and benefits of the
participation of additional states.
The observation that the major trading nations have perceived
participation in multilateral trade lawmaking as a club good is by no
means trivial. In fact, there are good reasons, as well as historical
precedents, for treating participation in trade lawmaking as a private
or a public good, rather than a club good. As recently as the early
twentieth century, both the United States and the United Kingdom
saw trade lawmaking as a private good that was best "shared" with
no one else. In the United States, Congress was for the most part
unwilling to let anyone interfere with its autonomy in setting tariff
levels.9 And the United Kingdom was "stubborn[ly] unilateral. . ." for
different reasons; the status of free trade in its political culture was
such that it saw any attempt to bargain over trade policy as heresy. 10
Conversely, it is not implausible to see participation in trade
lawmaking as a public good. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the
5. See Joanne Gowa & Soc Yeon Kim, An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects
of the GATT on Trade, 1950-94, 57 WORLD POL. 453, 455-56 (2005) (arguing that the
GATT "privileged trade expansion among the major trading nations").




9. William B. Kelly, Jr., Antecedents of Present Commercial Policy, 1922-
1934, in STUDIES IN UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL POLICY 1, 61 (William B. Kelly, Jr.
ed., 1963) ('Tariffs ... were regarded as a matter of strictly domestic concern and not a
subject for international discussion or negotiations.").
10. See FRANK TRENTMANN, FREE TRADE NATION: COMMERCE, CONSUMPTION,
AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN MODERN BRITAIN 12 (2008); see also id. at 147 (recording the
view held by senior British officials that "tariff bargains were 'a commercial sin"') and
159 (noting that Britain was "commercially internationalist but politically
isolationist").
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intellectual father of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program,
1 1
famously saw one of the principal objectives of an international trade
regime in the promotion of international peace. 12 Arguably, the
regime was more likely to serve this function when more states
participated in its creation and subsequently adhered to it. Indeed,
many international lawmaking endeavours aim for universal
adherence and are therefore as inclusive as possible. The U.S. plans
for an International Trade Organization (ITO) were no exception.
13
The ITO was supposed to be a universal organization with low
barriers to entry, 14 negotiated in the framework of the United
Nations through a process culminating in a multilateral conference
open to all members of the United Nations (the Havana
Conference). 15
What, then, prompted the major trading nations to complement
this universal ambition with, and eventually abandon it in favor of,
the club approach to multilateral trade lawmaking that is embodied
in the GATT? Examination of the historical material reveals three
factors that led these nations to see participation in multilateral
trade lawmaking as a club good: (1) the greater practicality of
negotiations among a smaller group of countries, (2) the insiders'
greater influence on the outcome of the negotiations, and (3) the
possibility subsequently to compel outsiders to join the agreement on
the insiders' terms (leverage). As shown below, these three rationales
11. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements program, the U.S. Congress
delegated authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with foreign countries to
the President. The original Trade Agreements Act was adopted in 1934. Foreign Trade
Agreements, 19 U. S. C. § 1351, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
12. See Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act,
and the WTO, in, REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY,
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 83 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2005).
13. At the London session of the Preparatory Conference for the ITO, the
Czech delegate reflected this view in his statement:
I believe there is no doubt that the main objective that we should
never lose sight of is to consolidate peace through economic
collaboration. We have no doubt that the more states that are
attracted and are able to join the I.T.O., the more fully this
objective and the more specific aims of the organization will be
achieved.
U.N. Economic and Social Council, Preparatory Committee of the International
Conference on Trade and Employment, VERBATIM REPORT OF THE SECOND MEETING OF
COMMITTEE II, U.N. DOc. E/PC/T/C.IIIPV/2 16 (Oct. 17, 1946) [hereinafter SECOND
MEETING OF COMMITTEE II].
14. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
15. The ITO was supposed to be a comprehensive international economic
organization. Apart from a chapter on commercial policy-which would become the
basis for the GATT-the ITO Charter contained chapters on employment and economic
activity, economic development and reconstruction, restrictive business practices, and
intergovernmental commodity agreements. See generally Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization, U.N. DOC. E/CONF. 2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948) [hereinafter
ITO Charter].
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for using the club approach help explain the patterns of participation
in multilateral trade lawmaking from the GATT/ITO preparatory
negotiations to the present. While the tools employed by the major
trading nations to implement the club approach, and the constraints
that they have faced in doing so, have evolved, these underlying
rationales have largely retained their force.
There are at least three reasons why it is important to
understand the club approach to multilateral trade lawmaking. First,
an understanding of how multilateral trade lawmaking has worked in
the past can shed light on the reasons why, except in certain
constellations, it no longer works today. While the club approach has
been a pervasive feature of lawmaking throughout the history of the
trading system, the opportunities for employing the club approach in
the WTO are much diminished. This is not only. due to the
requirement that new plurilateral agreements can only be added to
the WTO Agreement (and thus made subject to the dispute
settlement system) with the consensus of the entire membership.
16
The Article also argues that the club approach has become a victim of
its own success. In the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations,17 the
major developed countries managed to leverage the club approach to
force the developing countries to assume an unprecedented level of
obligations. It is unlikely that they will ever be able to replicate this
feat: not only have developing countries become adept at resisting the
club dynamics of the GATT era, but the very success of the club
approach in the Uruguay Round also means that the multilateral
trading system is now too valuable to the developed countries for
them to credibly threaten to abandon it in favor of a new club. Based
on the history of multilateral trade lawmaking, one would expect that
the most promising avenues for lawmaking are those in which
elements of the club dynamic are still present, such as negotiations
for accession to the WTO, negotiations in the context of existing
plurilateral agreements,18 negotiations of agreements whose benefits
are concentrated among a clearly circumscribed group of members
(so-called "critical mass agreements"),19 and negotiations of bilateral
16. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art.
X.9, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (Apr. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
17. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was launched in September 1986
at a Ministerial Meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The negotiations were concluded
in December 1993, and the results of the negotiations were adopted at a Ministerial
Meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, in April 1994.
18. In particular, the Government Procurement Agreement, a revised version
of which entered into force in April 2014. See Revised Agreement on Government
Procurement, ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT (Mar. 30 2012), http://www.wto.org/english/docs-ellegal-e/rev-gpr-
94_01_e.pdf [http://perma.cc/PFB5-5JAS] (archived Oct. 7, 2015).
19. Such as the so-called Information Technology Agreement. See Ministerial
Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products, WTJMIN(96)/16 (1996). A
subset of WTO Members recently concluded negotiations aimed at expanding the
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and regional preferential trade agreements outside the WTO.20 And
indeed, most lawmaking activity since the establishment of the WTO
has taken place across these fora. By uncovering the rationales for
using the club approach in the history of multilateral trade
lawmaking, the Article provides an explanation for this trend.
A second reason why it is important to analyze the history of
participation in multilateral trade negotiations is that it allows one to
gain a critical understanding of how the institutions, principles,
practices, and legal rules that shape the trade regime to this day were
established, defended, and made to work. Why did the major trading
powers decide to establish the exclusive GATT alongside the
universal ITO, and how did they try to reconcile the two institutions?
How did the United States and its developed country allies succeed in
entrenching the principle of reciprocity as the basis for trade
lawmaking, and which tools did they devise to exclude potential "free-
riders" from the benefits of the trade regime? How did the "Quad"
countries (the United States, the European Communities, Canada,
and Japan) manage to get the developing countries to sign up to an
agreement enshrining substantive intellectual property rights in the
Uruguay Round-even those who had been vehemently opposed to
such an agreement throughout the negotiations? As the Article will
show, the dynamics of the club approach to multilateral trade
lawmaking are at the heart of the answer to all these questions.
Finally, a keen appreciation of how the club approach has been
employed in the multilateral trading system can also provide the
basis for a normative evaluation of this lawmaking technique. While
such an evaluation is beyond the scope of this Article, it remains a
desideratum for future research, especially in light of recent
suggestions to employ the club approach that was pioneered in the
trading system in other areas of international lawmaking, such as
climate change regulation.
2 1
The Article consists of three Parts. The first gives a brief
overview of how the club concept has been used in the academic
literature so far and lays out the conception of the club approach
employed here. The second Part provides a detailed discussion of the
use of the club approach throughout the history of multilateral trade
lawmaking. The final Part concludes.
product scope of the ITA. See General Council, Declaration on the Expansion of Trade
in Information Technology Products, WT/L/956 (July 28, 2015).
20. The largest such agreement o date is the recently concluded Trans-Pacific
Partnership, which comprises twelve countries accounting for approximately one-third
of global trade.
21. See William Nordhaus, Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in
International Climate Policy, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1339 (2015) (discussing the viability
of a club approach to climate change negotiations); DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING
GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET
(2011) (arguing for the formation of "carbon clubs" and the negotiation of "climate
accession deals" inspired by the experience of GATTIWTO lawmaking).
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II. CONCEPTUALIZING CLUBS IN MULTILATERAL TRADE LAWMAKING
Many authors who describe the GATT as a club do not explain
what exactly they mean by this term. Gerard Curzon and Victoria
Curzon, in their paper on the "trader's club" of GATT, give little
indication of what makes the GATT a club, except that they note the
need to pay an "entrance fee" in order to be admitted.22 Several other
authors report the developing countries' perception of the GATT as a
"rich man's club," without exploring this notion further.2 3 In contrast
to Curzon and Curzon's focus on the relationship between members
and nonmembers of the GATT, the "rich man's club" notion appears
to locate both the insiders and outsiders within the GATT
membership; it refers to a lack of participation by developing
countries in the GATT, including those developing countries that
were contracting parties to the GATT.
2 4
More recently, several authors have defined the club concept
more explicitly, but in ways that appear to be at odds with older
conceptions. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have described the
"club model" of lawmaking as based on the exclusion of "officials in
other government bureaucracies and in international organizations in
different issue areas" on one hand and as operating largely outside
the view of the public on the other hand.2 5 Their conception is less
concerned with the participation of developing countries in trade
lawmaking, but refers primarily to the insularity of trade lawmakers
both in relation to domestic constituents and other areas of global
governance. Robert Wolfe has employed the club concept in yet a
different sense, namely to describe coalitions and informal groupings
in WTO lawmaking.
26
Little is gained by giving a meaning to the club concept that is at
odds with how that concept has been understood for most of the
22. Curzon & Curzon, supra note 4, at 305.
23. ALAN OXLEY, THE CHALLENGE OF FREE TRADE 103 (1990); HUGO PAEMEN &
ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN
THE URUGUAY ROUND 253 (1995); GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
TOKYO ROUND NEGOTIATION 256 (1986) [hereinafter WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND].
24. One can distinguish four dimensions of "participation" in GATT
lawmaking: first, participation can simply mean membership in the GATT; second,
participation can refer to involvement in GATT negotiations; third, participation can
refer to the level of commitments assumed in GATT negotiations; and fourth,
participation can refer to the level of benefits that a contracting party derives from
GATT rules. These dimensions of participation do not necessarily coincide. See Rorden
Wilkinson & James Scott, Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A
Reassessment, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 473, 473 (2008) (discussing the second dimension,
involvement); Gowa & Kim, supra note 6 (providing empirical evidence on the fourth
dimension (level of benefits, measured in terms of trade expansion)).
25. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5. Keohane and Nye's conception is taken up
by Hocking, supra note 5.
26. See Wolfe, supra note 4.
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GATT's history, however vague that understanding may have been.
Instead, this Article draws on the economic theory of clubs to give the
club concept more analytical depth. The economic theory of clubs,
focusing as it does on limitations imposed on participation in the
enjoyment of a good, is broadly consonant with the way in which the
club concept has traditionally been employed in the context of the
trading system. At the same time, the economic theory of clubs can
add some rigor to an analysis of the club approach to trade
lawmaking. It does so, first, by providing a conceptual framework for
thinking about the alternatives to treating participation in trade
lawmaking as a club good, and, second, by defining the circumstances
in which states face incentives to adopt a club approach to trade
lawmaking.
The economic theory of clubs, as first formulated by James
Buchanan, starts from the premise that "there exists some most
preferred or 'optimal' membership for almost any activity in which we
engage."2 7 Buchanan distinguishes club goods from "purely private"
goods on the one hand and from "purely public" goods on the other
hand. For "purely private" goods, "the optimal sharing arrangement.
• . is clearly one person (or one family unit).'2 8 For "purely public"
goods, on the other hand, "the optimal sharing group ... includes an
infinitely large number of members." 29 For Buchanan, the
"interesting cases are those goods and services, the consumption of
which involves some 'publicness,' where the optimal sharing group is
more than one person or family but smaller than an infinitely large
number"-in other words, club goods (and services). The "central
question in a theory of clubs," then, "is that of determining the
membership margin, so to speak, the size of the most desirable cost
and consumption sharing arrangement.'30 This optimal club size is
reached "when the marginal benefits that [a club member] secures
from having an additional member ... are just equal to the marginal
costs that he incurs from adding a member."
31
In applying Buchanan's insight to multilateral trade lawmaking,
the first question that needs to be answered is in relation to which
good the club dynamic is to be analyzed. This is an empirical
question; this Article therefore derives the answer from the historical
record analyzed below. As suggested below, the club good in question
is participation in multilateral trade lawmaking, in the sense of
involvement in negotiations and decision making.
This first question is inextricably linked with a second question:
What did the major trading nations perceive the benefits and costs of
27. See Buchanan, supra note 7, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 5.
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the participation of additional countries in trade lawmaking to be?
This is also an empirical question, which is explored in the following
Part. The contribution of the economic theory of clubs to the
argument at his stage is simply that it clarifies what it means to say
that states have treated participation in multilateral trade
lawmaking as a club good: it means that, more often than not, the
major trading nations have considered the costs of the participation of
additional states in multilateral trade lawmaking to outweigh the
benefits of such participation.
III. THE CLUB APPROACH IN THE HISTORY OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
LAWMAKING
When U.S. and British officials started negotiating about the
structure of the postwar trading order in the early 1940s, they
envisaged a universal international organization that would be the
counterpart of the United Nations in the economic sphere.3 2 This
"impulse to universality" 33 was reflected in the United States'
ambition to negotiate a charter for an international trade
organization through "United Nations machinery '3 4 and in the
persistence with which it sought the cooperation of the Soviet Union
and, to a lesser extent, China, in this endeavor. The United States
also agreed to add chapters on employment-and later and more
hesitantly, development-to its draft charter in order to widen the
appeal of the organization.
35
32. See U.S. Dep't of State, Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and
Employment 1, (1949) (laying out the State Department's vision for the postwar
international economic order, including the establishment of an "International Trade
Organization," in preparation for an "International Conference on Trade and
Employment"). Also see the statement of William L. Clayton, Under Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs in International Trade Organization: Hearings on Trade
Agreements System andProposed International Trade Organization Charter Before the
Senate Comm. On Finance, 80th Cong., I t 3 (1947) [hereinafter Senate Hearings],
where he noted:
The International Trade Organization is to be a forum where such
actions [affecting economic relations with other countries, N.L.] can
be discussed around the conference table before they are finally
taken just as contemplated political and military actions are
discussed in the organizations of the United Nations which have
been set up for that purpose.
33. Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, 46 INT'L
ORG. 681, 681 (1992).
34. Foreign Relations of the United States, VOLUME II, GENERAL: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL MA'TI'ERS 1944, at 15 [hereinafter FRUS 1944].
35. See Foreign Relations of the United States, VOLUME VI, THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH; THE FAR EAST 1945, at 118 [hereinafter FRUS 1945] (documenting
the Secretary of State's explanation to President Truman that the pledge to maintain
employment was "important to insure the cooperation of other countries in achieving
our trade objectives").
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It was during the discussions on the procedures for tariff
reductions that the U.S., UK, and Canadian negotiators first
considered an alternative paradigm of participation for the
multilateral trading system: the club. Subpart A discusses what
prompted these nations to see participation in tariff negotiations as a
club good. It will also explore how these countries attempted to
reconcile the club approach with their ambition to establish a
universal organization. Subpart B traces how the club dynamic
manifested itself in the practices of participation in multilateral trade
lawmaking throughout the history of the GATT. Subpart C argues
that a fundamental recalculation of the costs and benefits of the
participation of developing countries in the trading system led the
major developed countries to conclude the Uruguay Round with the
establishment of a new club with very different characteristics from
the GATT, namely, the WTO. Subpart D shows that the
establishment of the WTO has made the use of the club approach in
the multilateral trading system much more difficult, if not
impracticable. The club dynamic of participation survives in three
incarnations: overtly in accession negotiations, formalized in
negotiations in "variable geometry," and disguised in the increased
differentiation of obligations. However, it is heavily constrained:
procedurally, by transparency and reporting procedures that have
been put in place, and substantively, by the need to keep other WTO
members, who can now block an outcome that they perceive as
unfavorable, on board.
A. The Club Within: GATT and the ITO
There is ample evidence that the U.S. design for the postwar
trading order was originally of a universal nature. During the Second
World War, the United States leveraged the aid that it was granting
its allies to secure their commitment to enter into discussions on the
postwar international economic order with the United States and
other governments.3 6 This commitment was embodied in Article VII
of the mutual aid agreements under which the United States
provided material and logistical support to its allies. Article VII
committed the parties to "agreed action .,. . open to participation by
all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by
appropriate international and domestic measures, of production,
employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods."37 The
36. DouGLAS A. IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ALAN 0. SYKES, AM. LAW
INST., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 12-13 (2008).
37. See e.g., Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement, U.S.-U.K., art. VII, Feb.
28, 1942, 56 Stat. 1433; Mutual Aid Agreement between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.S-U.S.S.R., art. VII, June 11, 1942, 56 Stat.
1500.
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United States originally negotiated the wording of Article VII with
Britain but copied it verbatim into all later mutual aid agreements,
including those with the Soviet Union and China.
Even before the first exploratory discussions on the postwar
economic order pursuant to Article VII took place between the United
States and Britain, the British government suggested that the Soviet
Union and China be notified that such consultations were planned
and that they be kept "generally informed on the upshot of the
discussion."3 8 U.S. officials agreed; they were concerned not to "give
the impression that the United States and Great Britain were coming
to previous agreements on the matters [i.e., monetary and
commercial policy, N.L.] before other governments were brought in
and acquainted with the progress of the discussions."39 Referring to
Article VII of its mutual aid agreements, the United States further
informed the British that "the United States [was] in a somewhat
different position than that of the United Kingdom in respect to the
Soviet Government and the Chinese Government, in that the United
States ha[d] exactly the same commitments to those Governments
that it ha[d] to the United Kingdom Government."' 40 The U.S.
government had therefore decided "to extend invitations [to hold
exploratory talks] to the Soviet Government and to the Chinese
Government identical to those which ha[d] been extended to the
United Kingdom Government.
41
In the following months, the United States reiterated its desire
to enter into exploratory discussions on commercial policy with the
Soviet Union. At the tripartite conference of foreign ministers in
Moscow in October 1943, the United States presented a memorandum
on the "Bases of Our Program for International Economic
Cooperation," in which it suggested the "conclusion of a general
convention to which all of the important countries of the world would
be parties, which would lay down the rules and principles that should
govern trade relations between nations."
42
The United States also proposed the establishment of a
"Commission comprising representatives of the principal United
Nations," namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR,
and China, and "possibly certain others of the United Nations," such
as "Canada, the Netherlands and Brazil," to discuss and set up the
38. Foreign Relations of the United States, VOLUME I, GENERAL 1943, at 1108-
1109 [hereinafter FRUS 19431.
39. Id. at 1109.
40. Id. at 1110.
41. Id.; see also id. at 1111 (laying out in detail the particulars of the invitation
to the Soviet government); id. at 1118 (mentioning discussions between the
Department of State and the Chinese Embassy in Washington). Although there was no
mutual aid agreement between the United States and Canada, the United States
decided that exploratory discussions should be held with Canada as well. Id. at 1125.
42. Id. at 763.
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necessary procedures. The United States further presented a
memorandum summarizing the results of the exploratory discussions
between the United States and the United Kingdom,4 3 and stated
that it was "particularly important that similar conversations be
arranged soon between Soviet and American experts."4 4 In 1944,
President Roosevelt again urged the "establishment of United
Nations machinery for postwar economic collaboration" in separate
letters to Churchill and Stalin.
45
While the exploratory talks with the Soviet Union and China
never took place, the persistence with which the United States
attempted to initiate discussions-especially with the Soviet Union-
is evidence of its expectation that the international economic
arrangement of the postwar era would be firmly anchored within the
framework of the United Nations, in which the Soviet Union was
anticipated to play a key role. The United States also sought the
inclusion of the Soviet Union in the inner circle of the negotiations "as
a means of working out a solution of problems of [the] state trading
system"46-a further indication of the universal scope ultimately
desired for the proposed organization. Consistent with its ambition to
pursue the establishment of a postwar international economic order
through "United Nations machinery," the United States introduced a
resolution calling for an "International Conference on Trade and
Employment" at the First Session of the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations held in February 1946.4 7 The resolution
established a Preparatory Committee to elaborate a draft convention
and appointed nineteen states as members of the Committee. One
month before the first session of the Preparatory Committee in
October 1946, the United States published a "Suggested Charter for
an International Trade Organization of the United Nations" (the
Suggested Charter). Consistent with the "impulse to universality,"
48
the proposed organization was to have low barriers to entry: no more
43. See id. at 766-68.
44. Id. at 766; see also id. at 665-66 (documenting Secretary Hull's attempt to
impress the importance of international economic cooperation on Molotov by recalling
"the inadequate preparation on economic matters at the time of the Versailles
Conference and the incalculable harm which the world suffered as a result of the
inadequate treatment of economic problems after the last war").
45. FRUS 1944, supra note 34, at 14-15.
46. FRUS 1945, supra note 35, at 89.
47. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Report of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment,
1 U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/117/Rev.1 (July 9, 1947); see WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, JR., THE
UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL
OF THE ITO CHARTER AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 59 (1950)
(providing the full text of the resolution).
48. Kahler, supra note 33, at 681.
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was supposed to be required of new members than to accept the
obligations of the charter.
49
The Suggested Charter, however, also embodied a different
paradigm of participation with respect to one central issue: tariff
negotiations. It was in the context of their discussion of alternative
methods of tariff reductions that U.S., UK, and Canadian negotiators
first considered the idea of holding negotiations initially among a
"nucleus of important trading nations."50 Three rationales for the
"nuclear group," 51 or "club," 52 approach emerged during the
discussions. First, given that the United States insisted on using the
method of bilateral requests and offers to negotiate tariff reductions,
the three states considered it more practicable to conduct tariff
negotiations initially among a small group of countries. Recognizing
the limited negotiating capacity of its partners, including the United
Kingdom and Canada,53 the United States granted that "the number
of countries should be kept small since the greater the number
engaged in simultaneous negotiations the more difficult the
negotiating problem, particularly for countries other than the United
States."
54
Second, the club approach would allow the "nuclear" countries to
agree on the procedure for tariff reductions, as well as disciplines on
nontariff55 barriers, without having to take into account the views of
other countries. States that the nuclear countries feared would not be
constructive or sufficiently ambitious could simply be excluded
(unless their inclusion was essential for political or economic
reasons). The Canadians argued, for example, that
a general conference of all countries might be dangerous, since the views of the
many small countries might unduly weaken the bolder measures which the
large trading nations might find it possible to agree upon .... [J]udging from
49. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, art. 2 (1946) [hereinafter SUGGESTED
CHARTER]; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 32, at 3 ("Chapter II, relating to
membership, looks toward world-wide participation in the organization.").
50. FRUS 1945, supra note 35, at 59.
51. Id. at 72.
52. Id. at 65 (recording that the term "club" was first used by a Canadian
negotiator).
53. See id. at 90 (explaining that the impracticality of conducting multiple
bilateral negotiations simultaneously had been one of the principal objections of the
United Kingdom and Canada to the bilateral request-and-offer method of tariff
negotiations).
54. Id. at 88. See also Canada's remark that: "[ilt seemed obvious that this [i.e.,
bilateral tariff negotiations, N.L.] could not be done if too many countries were
involved, but it might be achieved among a relatively small nucleus of countries, say 8
to 12 of the major trading nations." Id. at 71.
55. The nontariff barriers that trade negotiators were concerned with at the
time included quantitative restrictions, exchange controls, subsidies, and barriers
arising from state trading.
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past experience, the presence at a general international conference of the less
important, and for the most part protectionist-minded, countries, would
inevitably result in a watering down of the commitments which a smaller
number of the major trading nations might find it possible to enter into.
5 6
There were some differences of opinion between the United
States and Canada regarding the extent to which legal disciplines on
nontariff barriers, rather than just bilateral tariff bargains, should be
definitely agreed among the smaller circle of countries. Given their
ambition to build a universal organization, the Americans had
"reservations" as to the "desirability of actually concluding the
arrangements among the nuclear group prior to the holding of a
general international trade conference at which the views of other
countries would be obtained.' 5 7 The Canadians, by contrast, were
adamant "that the arrangements among the nuclear group should not
be kept open and thereby made subject to changes at the general
conference."58 These differences notwithstanding, the proponents of
the nuclear approach clearly saw it as a way to shield certain
elements of the proposed trading arrangements-the procedure and
level of ambition of the tariff negotiations in the case of the United
States and the rules on nontariff barriers in the case of the
Canadians-from the scrutiny and influence of outsiders.
A third, and related, rationale for the nuclear approach was that
it would, at a later stage, present the opportunity to force outsiders
into the arrangement on the nuclear group's terms. U.S. negotiators
envisaged that the level of tariff reductions agreed among the
members of the nuclear group "would create the standard by which to
judge the requirements to which other nations joining the
organisation should be expected to conform .... [It] would be the test
of what other countries joining the organisation should do in this
respect.'59 The proponents of the club approach expected that, given
its members' share in international trade, the nuclear group would
exert a pull on outsiders to join the arrangement, even though the
latter would have had no part in its creation and little say about its
terms. Harry Hawkins, who first brought up the idea of an agreement
among a "nucleus of important trading nations," assumed that "other
countries might be more or less obliged to adhere" to it. 60 The
Canadians were greatly preoccupied with the question of how to
achieve the "compulsion of outsiders"; they were concerned that the
bilateral method of tariff reduction was not well suited for use "as a
weapon to force" "reluctant countries" to participate in the
56. Id. at 64; id. at 71-72.
57. Id. at 73.
58. Id.
59. SECOND MEETING OF COMMITTEE II, supra note 13, at 9.
60. FRUS 1945, supra note 35, at 59.
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agreement.6 1 One approach discussed between the United States and
Canada to deal with this question was to require new members "to
negotiate their way in by entering into bilateral agreements with
each of the countries making up the nuclear group," under the threat
that tariff concessions that the members of the nuclear group had
negotiated with each other might otherwise be withdrawn after a
"probational period.' 62 It was this approach that the United States
ultimately incorporated into its Suggested Charter.
The Suggested Charter published by the United States in
September 1946 envisaged the following reconciliation of the club
approach to the tariff negotiations with the universal ambit of the
ITO. The GATT and the ITO Charter would be negotiated on separate
institutional tracks.6 3 While the preparatory negotiations for the
Havana Conference, at which the ITO Charter was to be concluded,
were sponsored by the United Nations Economic and Social Council,
the GATT would be, as the Suggested Charter explained, an
''arrangement for the concerted reduction of tariffs and trade barriers
among the countries invited by the United States to enter into
negotiations for this purpose."64 Once the ITO Charter came into
force, the exclusive character of the GATT would be temporarily
preserved within the ITO in the form of an "Interim Tariff
Committee," which would originally consist of all ITO members that
were also parties to the GATT.65 The sole task of this Committee
would be to decide whether an ITO member had complied with its
obligation, under Article 18(1) of the Suggested Charter, to enter,
upon request, into "reciprocal and mutually advantageous
negotiations" with other members "directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs (or of margins of protection afforded by state
trading) on imports and exports."66 If the Committee determined that
a member had failed to fulfil this obligation "within a reasonable
period of time," it could authorize
the complaining Member, or in exceptional cases the Members of the
Organization generally ... notwithstanding the provisions of Article 8 [General
61. Id. at 67-68; see also id. at 72 (recording a discussion of how to deal with
"countries refusing to participate").
62. Id. at 73. The negotiators acknowledged that these questions would
"require the reexamination of existing most-favored-nation commitments." Id.
63. BROWN, supra note 47, at 61-63.
64. SUGGESTED CHARTER, supra note 49, art. 56, 2 n.1 (emphasis added); see
also BROWN, supra note 47, at 61-63 (highlighting the institutional separateness of the
negotiation of the GATT from the preparatory negotiations for the ITO Charter).
65. SUGGESTED CHARTER, supra note 49, art. 56, 1; see also N.G. Crowley &
C.P. Haddon-Cave, The Regulation and Expansion of World Trade and Employment, 23
ECON. REc. 32, 42 (1947) (discussing the state of the draft on the Interim Tariff
Committee after the conclusion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee,
which took place in London in 1946).
66. SUGGESTED CHARTER, supra note 49, art. 18, 1.
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Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, N.L.] ... to withhold from the trade of the
other Member any of the tariff reductions which the complaining Member, or
the Members of the Organization generally ... may have negotiated pursuant
to paragraph 1 of this Article.
6 7
ITO members that were not original parties to the GATT could
only join the Committee when, "in the judgment of the Committee,"
they had undertaken tariff reductions "comparable in scope or effect
to those completed by the original members of the Committee."68 In
other words, they had to "negotiate their way in," as the United
States and Canada had envisaged during their exploratory
discussions. 69 Only when two-thirds of the ITO's members had
become members of the Interim Tariff Committee would the
Committee cease operation and its functions be transferred to the
ITO membership as a whole.
70
The Interim Tariff Committee, then, was to be the club within.
Its members would have controlled admission, with wide discretion to
decide whether the prospective entrant had earned the privileges of
membership,71 and would have been able to wield the ultimate power
in the trade context-the power to authorize the suspension of tariff
concessions-against any member who refused to engage in tariff
negotiations to the satisfaction of its trading partners. Although the
obligation to engage in tariff negotiations was to be couched in
general terms ("Each Member ... shall .. "), it was clearly directed
at those outside the club who had not already undertaken such
negotiations (and had been excluded from the club in the first place
partly on the basis of their presumed unwillingness to engage in
them). Thus, the ostensible institutional "reconciliation" of the GATT
with the ITO was from the start conspicuously informed by the third
rationale for the club approach: the ability of club members to force
others to join the club on the members' terms.
The U.S. draft of this arrangement survived the sessions of the
Preparatory Committee in London and Geneva relatively
unscathed 72-perhaps unsurprisingly, since all members of the
67. Id. art. 18, 3, at 12.
68. Id. art. 56, 2, at 37-38.
69. FRUS 1945, supra note 35, at 73.
70. SUGGESTED CHARTER, supra note 49, art. 56 2, at 37-38.
71. The Suggested Charter did not foresee a right for ITO members to appeal
decisions of the Interim Tariff Committee to the Conference. Introducing such a right
was discussed at the Havana Conference.
72. The articles corresponding to Articles 18 and 56 in the Suggested Charter
are identical in the London Draft of the Charter (Articles 24 and 67, respectively). See
U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Report of the First Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment,
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 (1946). They are slightly modified and developed in the Geneva
Draft (Articles 17 and 81, respectively). See U.N. Conference on Trade and
Employment, Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United
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Preparatory Committee could expect to become original members of
the GATT and thus of the Interim Tariff Committee envisaged in the
London Draft (which became a permanent Tariff Committee in the
Geneva Draft of the Charter).73 At the Havana Conference, however,
the arrangement faced a backlash from the prospective outsiders.
They were particularly aggrieved that the draft charter did not
provide for an appeal of the decisions of the Tariff Committee (either
to the Executive Board, the Conference, the International Court of
Justice, or through dispute settlement proceedings).74 During the
negotiations, the UK negotiator acknowledged that the
Tariff Committee's special membership and consequent independent character
and function had caused confusion and even the suspicion that the Tariff
Committee would be an exclusive club unaccessible to countries with no basis
to carry out the undertakings contained in Article 17 [the obligation to carry
out tariff negotiations, N.L.], and that the club's exclusiveness would enable the
members to exercise unduly powerful influence over the work of the
Organization.
75
Canada likewise recognized the "fear of some countries" that,
under the arrangement envisaged by the draft charter, "powerful
countries might force substantial tariff reductions on weaker ones,
and that in the case of refusal, the latter would be kept from
participation in the Organization." 76 However, both the United
Kingdom and Canada tried to reassure the opponents that these fears
were unfounded, pointing to the experience of negotiating the GATT
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, at 17-18, 51, E/PC/T/186 (Sept. 10,
1947) [hereinafter "Geneva Draft"]. In the Geneva Draft, ITO members who
successfully conclude tariff negotiations under Article 17 automatically become
contracting parties to the GATT and thereby also members of a (now permanent)
"Tariff Committee"; the Tariff Committee only exercises indirect control over the
accession of new members (i.e., through the power to determine, in case of a
disagreement, whether the latter have complied with their obligation to "enter into and
carry out" tariff negotiations). See id. at 17-18, 51 (containing text of Articles 17(1)(d)
and 81(2), respectively).
73. The United States extended the invitation to conduct tariff negotiations to
all members of the Preparatory Committee. See BROWN, supra note 47, at 61-62
(discussing the role of the Preparatory Committee in the tariff negotiations that led to
the conclusion of the GATT). By 1947, the "nuclear" group had thus become
synonymous with the Preparatory Committee. See Foreign Relations of the United
States, VOLUME I, GENERAL; THE UNITED NATIONS 1947, at 912 n.* ("Nuclear countries
were those represented on the Preparatory Committee.").
74. The Tariff Committee was explicitly exempt from the final authority of the
Conference. See Geneva Draft, supra note 72, at 48 (containing text of Article 74 (1)).
75. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Sixth Committee:
Organization, Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting, at 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.2/C.6/SR.14 (Dec. 19, 1947) [hereinafter Summary Record of the Fourteenth
Meeting]. At some point in the discussion, the United Kingdom had apparently also
referred to the Tariff Committee as an "oligarchy"; this characterization was mentioned
by Peru. Id. at 8.
76. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Sixth Committee:
Organization, Summary Record of the Fifteenth Meeting, at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.2/C.6/SR.15 (Dec. 26, 1947).
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at the second session of the Preparatory Committee. The United
Kingdom claimed that "most countries could find a basis for tariff
agreements," and even countries that had not negotiated tariff
agreements might still be admitted to the Tariff Committee.
7 7
The United States was less apologetic. The U.S. negotiator
explained that
the central objective of the Organization was the reduction of tariffs and other
obstacles to international trade. Only countries which had carried out the
negotiations required by Article 17 should be members of the Tariff
Committee-some countries present at the Conference had already done so and
shown what could be done. Experience between the two World Wars showed the
danger of adopting resolutions at international conferences which lacked any
provision making for their implementation. Article 81 was one of the articles in
the Charter which ensured this practice was not to be repeated and his
delegation regarded it as of the highest importance.
78
At the first meeting of a subcommittee set up to study the question,
the official set out the U.S. position in even stronger terms,
emphasizing
that the Organization was not to be a goodwill mission occupied in merely
passing resolutions but it was to be an organization tied to action. The question
before the Sub-Committee was not one of two international organizations-The
Trade Organization and the Tariff Committee-but was one of two steps in a
process towards obtaining the benefits of the Charter. One stop in this process
was acceptance of the Charter; the other was the negotiations under Article 17,
the conclusion of which gave automatic membership in the Tariff Committee.
In connection with the second step it was correct that the necessary
determination should be made only by Members which had carried out the
negotiations themselves.
79
What is striking is the peculiar meaning with which the United
States imbued the concepts "doing" and "action" in these statements.
It was certainly not the case that the countries against which this
remark was directed did not want "action"; however, they wanted
"action" that was different from the "action" envisaged by the United
States.8 0 By framing its demand that other countries engage in a
particular practice, namely reciprocal tariff negotiations, as a generic
call for "action" and for something that "can be done," the United
77. Summary Record of the Fourteenth Meeting, supra note 75, at 2-3
(emphasis omitted).
78. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
79. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Sixth Committee:
Organization, Sub-Committee on Article 81 (the Tariff Committee), Summary Record of
the First Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/W.8, at 2, (Dec. 24, 1947) (emphasis added).
80. In particular, the less developed countries participating in the tariff
negotiations had argued for positive obligations to be imposed on ITO members to aid
the development of the less developed countries. They also criticized the unwillingness
of the United Nations to accept any discipline regarding subsidies, in particular
regarding agricultural products.
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States signalled that the way it imagined trade lawmaking was the
only way to do it. And against the backdrop of the club dynamic, this
was not mere rhetoric. The club approach allowed the United States
to actually make their "action" (i.e., reciprocal tariff negotiations) the
only game in town. It was this ability to marry institutional power to
the imagery of "action" and "ambition" that allowed the United States
and the other major trading countries to gradually entrench the
conception of trade lawmaking as necessarily based on reciprocity.
The controversy between the prospective insiders and outsiders
about the authority and composition of the Tariff Committee was
ultimately resolved through a compromise. The United States had
managed to establish a somewhat dubious parallelism between the
Tariff Committee and a proposed Committee for Economic
Development.81 The compromise consisted of eliminating both the
Tariff Committee and the Economic Development Committee from
the Charter.82 Even without its institutional embodiment, however,
the club dynamic of the relationship between the GATT and the wider
ITO membership was preserved. This was accomplished by reversing
the burden of proof in cases where a GATT member considered that a
non-GATT member had failed to carry out tariff negotiations to the
former's satisfaction. Under the Geneva draft of the Charter, the
GATT member would have had to refer the matter to the Tariff
Committee, which would have had to authorize the suspension of
tariff concessions.83 Under the ITO Charter, a GATT member could
unilaterally suspend tariff concessions towards any ITO member that
had not acceded to the GATT two years after the ITO Charter had
come into force unless the Organization decided, by majority vote, to
"require the continued application" of concessions on the basis that
the ITO member in question had been "unreasonably prevented" from
acceding to the GATT.8 4 While this arrangement made it easier for
an individual member to suspend concessions in response to
unsatisfactory negotiations, it allowed all ITO members a say in
whether this suspension was justified.
Although the ITO Charter never came into force, the controversy
about the Tariff Committee sheds light on what kind of institution
the major trading powers intended the GATT to be. The club
character of the GATT was designed to guarantee the principle of
reciprocity, which the ITO Charter stated in the following terms: "No
81. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Tariff Committee and
Committee on Economic Development, Note Submitted for Discussion by Australian,
Mexican and United States Delegation, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.21W.15 (Jan. 20, 1948).
82. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Report of the Co-Ordinating
Committee to the Heads of Delegations, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2145, at 12-15 (Mar. 2,
1948) [hereinafter E/Cof.2145]; BROWN, supra note 47, at 157-58.
83. Geneva Draft, supra note 72, at 17-18, 51 (containing text of Articles
17(1)(d) and 81(2), respectively).
84. ITO Charter, supra note 15, art. 17, 4(b).
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Member shall be required to grant unilateral concessions, or to grant
concessions to other Members without receiving adequate concessions
in return."
85
The most-favored nation (MFN) principle-which obliged any
ITO member to extend any trade benefit that they granted to any
country to all other ITO members86-harbored the danger that tariff
concessions that GATT contracting parties had granted to one
another would go permanently unrequited. The provisions concerning
the (Interim) Tariff Committee in the drafts of the Charter, and on
the right to withdraw tariff concessions unilaterally in the final
version of the Charter, were designed to allow GATT members to
exact a payment for these concessions from other ITO members. More
fundamentally, they gave GATT members the leverage to establish
the principle of payment as the uncontested foundation for tariff
negotiations. Whoever was not prepared to pay for tariff concessions
could simply be excluded from the club.
B. The Self-Perpetuating Club: Participation in GATT Negotiations
The stillbirth of the ITO dispensed with the need for complicated
derogations from the most-favored nation principle: since the most-
favored nation rule now only applied among GATT members in the
first place, derogations were no longer necessary to allow them to
enforce the principle of payment vis-A-vis outsiders. 87 Instead of
being "the club within" a larger organization, the GATT was now a
club, period. The interaction between those inside and outside the
GATT would henceforth be exclusively governed by the accession
85. Id. art. 17, 2(b).
86. See id. art. 16, 1 ("[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any Member to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for all other Member countries.").
87. In fact, the possibility for such derogation was temporarily preserved even
in the GATT. In 1948, GATT Article XXV was amended to reflect the obligation to
conduct tariff negotiations under Article 17(1) of the ITO Charter. In contrast to the
compromise included in Article 17(4) of the ITO Charter, whereby a GATT member
could unilaterally decide to withhold tariff concessions from an ITO member that it
deemed had not complied with this obligation, a contracting party could only withhold
tariff concessions towards another contracting party of the GATT after having been
authorized to do so by the contracting parties acting jointly, and not at all if it had
directly negotiated any tariff concessions in its schedule with the contracting party in
question. This provision was never utilized and was deleted at the 1955 Review
Session-a further indication that the obligation to enter into tariff negotiations was
directed against those ITO members who remained outside the GATT. See GATTFirst
Session of the Contracting Parties: Summary Record of the Second Meeting, GATT Dc.
GATT/1/SR.2, at 3 (Mar. 4, 1948); GATT First Session of the Contracting Parties:
Revision of Draft Protocol Contained in Document GATT1/28 Modifying Certain
General Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Dec.
GATT/1/47/Rev.1 (Mar. 19, 1948); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 542 (1969).
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procedure of GATT Article XXXlI, which provided that governments
could accede to the agreement "on terms to be agreed" between the
government in question and the contracting parties to the GATT. The
contracting parties took utmost care to ensure that every one of them
could individually insist on receiving adequate payment in the
accession process: when in 1948, the decision rule for admissions of
new members was changed from unanimity to a two-thirds majority
of the contracting parties (at the request of the ITO negotiators who
hoped to minimize the risk that ITO members might be
"unreasonably prevented" from joining the GATT 88), the contracting
parties added GATT Article XXXV, which allowed individual
contracting parties not to apply tariff concessions, or the entire
agreement, to a new contracting party as long as it had not entered
into tariff negotiations with that party.8 9 The negotiators perceived
the new article as necessary because a two-thirds majority of the
contracting parties could otherwise have "oblige[d] a Contracting
Party to enter into a trade agreement with another country, without
its consent."90
It was not primarily due to the provisions on accession, however,
that the image of GATT as a "club" became ingrained in the
imagination of observers and a steadily* increasing subset of its
contracting parties over the following decades.91 In fact, the large
majority of countries acceding to the GATT over the following decades
were developing countries that had emerged from colonial rule and
could join the GATT by simply succeeding into the obligations that
their former colonial masters had assumed with respect to their
88. See GATT Sub-Committee on Supersession: Report to the Contracting
Parties, GATT Doc. GATT/1/21, at 3 (Mar. 11, 1948) ("[The amendment] give[s] effect to
the recommendation of the Co-ordinating Committee and the Heads of Delegations of
the United Nations Conference."); E/Conf.2/45, supra note 82, at 14 (illustrating the
context in which the proposal to change the decision rule arose).
89. The new article was proposed by the United States. GATTFirst Session of
the Contracting Parties: Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, GATT Doc.
GATT/1/SR.7, at 4-5, (Mar. 15, 1948) [hereinafter GATT/I/SR.7]. For background on
accessions under GATT Article XXXIII, see JACKSON, supra note 87, at 92-96. For
background on the so-called non-application clause (GATT Article XXXV), see
JACKSON, supra note 87, at 100-02.
90. GATT/I/SR.7, supra note 89, at 5; see also GATT Executive Secretary,
Application of Article XXXV to Japan: Origins of Article XXXV and Factual Account of
its Application in the Case of Japan, GATT Doc. L1466, at 1, (May 11, 1961).
91. Over this time, the notion that developing countries regarded the GATT as
a "rich man's club" became commonplace. Thus, Oxley, the Australian ambassador to
the GATT, commented in 1990, "Global trade liberalization was regarded as a
plaything of the rich and GATT was derided as a rich man's club." OXLEY, supra note
23, at 103. Hugo Paemen and Alexandra Bensch, two European trade negotiators, note
about the Uruguay Round: 'The developing countries were among those least
enthusiastic about launching forth into the Uruguay Round. The GATT had always
seemed to them a 'rich men's club."' PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 253.
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territories.92 The perception that the GATT operated as a club arose
instead from the way in which the practices that determined who
participated in and benefited from trade negotiations reproduced and
perpetuated the club dynamic within the framework of the GATT
itself. As the Article argues below, there were four such practices: (1)
the practice of negotiating tariff concessions primarily, and often
exclusively, with the principal supplier of a product; (2) the practice of
excluding certain product categories and types of trade barriers from
negotiations; (3) the practice of concluding agreements on tariff
formulas and nontariff barriers among small groups of countries
constituting a "critical mass"; and (4) the practice of conducting
negotiations in an often informal and secretive way. These practices
reproduced and perpetuated the club dynamic not so much because
they de jure excluded any countries from most favored nation
treatment. Rather, they de facto excluded a large number of GATT
members, largely developing countries, from meaningful participation
in multilateral trade lawmaking and from the benefits of trade
liberalization.
Before discussing these practices in more detail, the Article will
briefly recall the three major motivations for the club approach that
had been made explicit in the preparatory discussions to the GATT:
(1) the greater practicality of negotiating and reaching agreement
among a smaller group of countries, (2) the ability to shape the
content of this agreement more decisively than would otherwise be
feasible, and (3) the possibility to compel outsiders to join the
agreement largely on the insiders' terms. In the academic literature,
the first factor is the most popular explanation for why the core
GATT countries continued to operate as a de facto club in many
respects. Many scholars emphasize the ease with which agreement
could be reached among the likeminded core of the GATT countries.
As Robert Hudec memorably put it, the GATT was "a place where the
leading countries could go off to do business by themselves,
92. Curzon and Curzon, writing in 1973, noted that:
[S]ince most newcomers are newly independent and not very well off,
established GATT members do not normally drive too hard a bargain, and
many former dependencies enter without any payment at all if they
happened to be within GATT's territorial application before they gained
independence.
Curzon & Curzon, supra note 4, at 305. There were also some hard accession
negotiations, however. Curzon and Curzon mention Switzerland's accession. See id.
("Switzerland ... took two years to negotiate provisional accession and a further eight
years to achieve full membership because a number of agricultural
exporters ... objected to Switzerland's all too efficient form of agricultural protection
and felt that it could afford to import more cheap food."). Moreover, "the few planned
economy countries which did join the GATT had been obliged to accept accession
protocols which substantially curtailed their rights." PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23,
at 88. See generally Francine McKenzie, GATT and the Cold War. Accession Debates,
Institutional Development, and the Western Alliance, 1947-1959, 10 J. COLD WAR STUD.
78 (2008).
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unencumbered by the complexities of a larger organization ... [a]
place (one might almost say a club) where likeminded people could
get together and do their work in peace."
93
As the discussion in this subpart will demonstrate, however, the
other two factors are very much part of the explanation as well and
significantly increased in importance over time. Thus, by contenting
themselves with "do[ing] business by themselves," the "leading
countries" could not only reach agreement more easily but could also
keep doing things their way. During the first two decades of the
GATT, "doing things their way" meant sticking to reciprocity and the
principal supplier rule as the basis for tariff negotiations and limiting
the scope of negotiations to tariffs on manufactured products. What
stands out about the club dynamic of GATT negotiations during this
time is that it was self perpetuating, in the sense that negotiating
principles like reciprocity and the principal supplier rule
automatically excluded those who were not able or willing to play by
the "leading countries" rules from the benefits of trade liberalization,
hence providing them with a strong incentive to participate in trade
negotiations on the insiders' terms.
This structure changed somewhat during the late 1960s and
1970s, as the focus began to shift from tariff negotiations to the
negotiation of codes elaborating GATT provisions and formulating
rules on the use of nontariff measures. The major trading nations
largely continued to "do business by themselves" and thereby shaped
the content of the codes. This was achieved by concluding agreements
among a critical mass of (mostly developed) countries and by
conducting the negotiations in a secretive and exclusionary manner.
In relation to the codes, however, the ability of the core to compel the
adherence of outsiders proved to be limited by the unconditional
most-favored nation clause of the GATT. Towards the end and in the
aftermath of the Tokyo Round,9 4 this limitation led to increasing
frustration on the part of developed countries, in particular the
United States. As will be discussed in the next subpart, it was the
increasing failure of the club approach to achieve the compulsion of
outsiders, combined with a fundamental recalculation of the costs and
benefits of the participation of developing countries in the trading
system that led the developed countries to adopt a radical new
strategy for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round: the constitution of
a new club with the primary purpose of achieving the compulsion of
outsiders.
93. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMAcY 51 (1975).
94. The Tokyo Round was launched in Tokyo in 1973 and concluded in 1979.
See generally WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23 (providing a comprehensive
historical analysis of the Tokyo Round negotiations).
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In the following sections, however, the Article will first describe
the four practices that governed participation in multilateral trade
negotiations and that reflected and sustained the club dynamic of
those negotiations, over the period from the early GATT until the
Uruguay Round.
1. Who Can Negotiate: The Principle of Payment and the Principal
Supplier Rule
The principle of payment, which governed GATT negotiations
from the outset, played a central role in ensuring that trade
negotiations continued to exhibit a club dynamic. Only those nations
with something to "sell" (i.e., access to a lucrative market) were in a
position to demand concessions from their negotiating partners.95 As
Winham has put it:
[I]nfluence in a tariff negotiation is a direct function of the size of a nation's
trade. Nations with smaller trade flows simply are not in a position to offer
many concessions to other countries and hence have little standing in a
negotiation where the modus operandi is reciprocal exchange .... [T]he fact
that GATT negotiations have traditionally been tariff negotiations has probably
increased the tendency of developing countries to regard GATT as a rich man's
club.
9 6
By making effective participation in trade negotiations dependent on
market size (i.e., on a country's ability to "sell" something of interest
to other countries), the principle of payment reduced the role of small
and less economically developed countries in trade negotiations.
Even if an economically less powerful country was willing and
able to offer concessions in tariff negotiations, its ability to demand
concessions from its trading partners was limited by the principal
supplier rule.9 7 This rule explicitly entitled participants in trade
negotiations to reject requests for tariff concessions when the country
requesting the concessions was not the principal supplier of the
95. See Gilbert R. Winham, GATT and the International Trade Rggime, 45
INT'L J. 796, 814 (1990) ("The effect of the norm of reciprocity meant that only those
nations that had significant trade flows were in a position to give, and therefore
demand, concessions from trading partners. Tariff negotiations thus marginalized the
developing countries, because their trade flows were small and they had little to offer
in return for the benefits they sought.").
96. WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23, at 256.
97. The role of the principal supplier rule in limiting the participation of
developing countries in trade negotiations is widely acknowledged in the literature. See
Gowa & Kim, supra note 6, at 455; Wilkinson & Scott, supra note 24, at 485 ("Indeed,
the reliance on reciprocity, the principal supplier rule and the focus solely on tariffs, all
had a detrimental effect on the capacity of developing countries to participate in tariff
negotiations.").
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product in question.9 8 As a result, it pushed any country that did not
already have major export volumes of particular products to the
sidelines of trade negotiations, limiting their potential to profit from
trade negotiations to the accidental benefits from tariff reductions
agreed between the major trading powers.
99
The club dynamic produced by the principle of payment and the
principal supplier rule was self perpetuating: the exchange of
concessions among the major trading countries, whose markets were
attractive to each other and who tended to be the principal suppliers
of the bulk of each other's imports, expanded trade among these
countries, making it more difficult for others to break into the core of
the club. At the same time, these negotiating practices had a powerful
assimilating effect. Any country that hoped to benefit from trade
negotiations had to be prepared to play by the rules of the game,
thereby perpetuating these rules. As a result, the GATT confined "its
active membership to willing liberalisers."
100
2. What Can Be Negotiated: Limitations on Products and Policies
The major trading nations further limited the scope for effective
participation in trade negotiations by circumscribing the subject
matter of negotiations to those products and trade policy instruments
98. See Cordell Hull, U.S. Sec'y of State, American Foreign Trade Policies:
Address Before the Chamber of Commerce of the United State (Apr. 30, 1936), in 24
DEP'T OF STATE COM. POL'Y SERIES, at 15.
Our rule is that the duty reductions granted to each individual
country are restricted to those commodities of which the particular
country is the chief supplier to the United States. If it should
happen, however, that, under existing abnormal conditions, some
other country at any later stage profits unduly from the benefit of
the concession, we retain the right, when such contingency arises,
to modify the original grant.
Id.; see also JOHN W. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: THE
TWILIGHT OF THE GATT? 6 (1971) ("[A]ny tariff reduction granted in a bilateral
negotiation had to be 'generalized,' leading to the practice of limiting such reductions to
tariffs on products principally supplied be the negotiating partner in order that
,unrequited benefits' to other countries might be avoided."); HARRY C. HAWKINS,
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 81-82 (1951)
("[T]he United States granted concessions on particular products to the country that
had supplied the greatest proportion of our imports .... [E]ach concession was made to
the country that had the greatest interest in it."); Transcript of Interview by Richard D.
Mckinzie with John M. Leddy (June 15, 1973), HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY &
MUSEUM, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhistleddyj.htm [http://perma.cc/C5DM-
YQQN] (archived Oct. 4, 2015) ("[Y]ou would find that one or two, possibly, maybe
three, countries made up the bulk of the whole imported supply. They were the chief
and most effective competitors, and that, therefore, you would not lose much
bargaining power by extending the concession to others.").
99. See Gowa & Kim, supra note 6, at 455-56 (noting the small number of
countries that directly benefited from the bargaining protocol under the GATT).
100. Paul Collier, Why the WTO is Deadlocked: And What Can Be Done About
It, 29 WORLD ECON. 1423, 1425 (2006).
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that were of most interest to them. This involved not only the
effective exclusion of entire sectors, such as agricultural products and
textiles, from meaningful liberalization commitments. It also meant
the drawing of ever finer distinctions within product categories-in
other words, the definition of subdivisions of products solely for
purposes of tariff classification-in order to ensure that the benefits
from a negotiated tariff concession did not spill over to countries that
supplied a similar product but had not paid for the concession.
The special status accorded to agricultural products and textiles
in trade negotiations within the framework of the GATT up until the
Uruguay Round is well known.10 1 In addition to the special treatment
of agriculture, for example, in relation to quantitative restrictions,
which was already enshrined in the GATT itself, the United States
and European countries obtained waivers that left them with
virtually complete freedom to protect their agricultural markets.
10 2
The protective instruments imposed for this purpose, among which
quotas-normally prohibited by the GATT 103-featured prominently,
were largely excluded from the scope of GATT negotiations up until
the Uruguay Round.
Developing countries faced a similar problem with regard to
tropical products, which were often their major export items.10 4 By
contrast to agricultural commodities that could also be produced in
temperate zones, tropical products did not face high market access
barriers, but their consumption was often subject to internal taxes for
revenue purposes, which were similarly excluded from the scope of
trade negotiations under the GATT. 10 5
But product selection also occurred in sectors that were at the
center of the negotiations. Here, the desire to "concentrat[e]
concessions on those products exported only by participants . . .
101. See generally VINOD K. AGGARwAL, LIBERAL PROTECTIONISM: THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ORGANIZED TEXTILE TRADE (1985) (chronicling the history
of developed countries' attempts to organize the trade in textile products under the
GATT); TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, STEFAN TANGERMANN & T.K. WARLEY, AGRICULTURE IN
THE GATT (1996) (analyzing the special role of agricultural trade throughout the
history of the GATT). Gowa and Kim note that even the trade of Italy and Japan, two
states that are commonly perceived as belonging to the core of the GATT, did not profit
as significantly from the GATT as the trade of those states belonging to the "privileged
group" (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the United States) because "both
countries specialized in precisely those products [agricultural goods and textiles] that
privileged group members succeeded in exempting from GATT rules." Gowa & Kim,
supra note 6, at 455-56.
102. See JOSLING, TANGERMANN & WARLEY, supra note 101, at 11, 26-31.
103. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XI, 1.
104. Committee III on Expansion of Trade, Special Report of Committee 11" to
the Contracting Parties, 7, L/1557, annex, at 8 (Sept. 27, 1961).
105. Id. 8, at 8-9.
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sometimes required that new product categories be developed."
10 6
The contracting parties achieved this by introducing new subdivisions
into their tariff schedules. This so-called "tariff specialisation" (i.e.,
the "detailed classification of products for duty purposes") had long
been recognized as a way "to evade most-favoured-nation
obligations"1 07-or, at the very least, to minimize their effects.
The tension between tariff specialization and the MFN principle
broke into the open in a number of trade disputes over the course of
GATT history. These disputes demonstrate the importance that the
GATT's contracting parties attributed to their ability to use tariff
specialization as a means of excluding contracting parties that had
not paid for a concession from the benefits of that concession.
One example is the Japan/Canada-Dimension Lumber case.
108
Canada argued that certain types of lumber falling under different
headings in the Japanese tariff were "like" products, and that the
different tariff treatment of these products-some of which were
predominantly found in the United States, some predominantly in
Canada-was therefore inconsistent with Japan's MFN obligations.
While the tariff lines at issue had not been created for the purposes of
negotiations, but reflected unilateral decisions by Japan in light of its
import and protection needs,109 the arguments of Japan highlight the
important role that Japan attributed to tariff specialization for
limiting the benefits from tariff concessions to those who pay for
them. Thus, Japan argued that, if contracting parties were permitted
to reclassify products in other contracting parties' tariff schedules on
the basis that these products were "like," such reclassifications "could
106. J.M. Finger, Trade Liberalization: A Public Choice Perspective, in
CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 421, 426 (Ryan C.
Amacher et al. eds., 1979).
107. HAWKINS, supra note 98, at 88; see also LEAGUE OF NATIONS, ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL SECTION, MEMORANDUM ON DISCRIMINATORY TARIFF CLASSIFICATIONS,
TRANSMITTED BY W.T. PATE (1927).
108. Report of the Panel, Canada/Japan: Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir
(SPF) Dimension Lumber, 3.37, L/6470 (July 19, 1989) GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at
167, 186 (1990) [hereinafter L/64701 ("In the Canadian view the duty on SPF dimension
lumber was an example of 'tariff specialization."').
109. Id. 3.8, 3.21, 4.16, 5.5, at 177, 181, 196, 197 ('The Panel noted that the
tariff classification for 4407.10-110 had been established autonomously by Japan,
without negotiation."). But see Robert E. Hudec, "Like Product The Differences in
Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 101, 114 (Thomas Cottier & Petros
Mavroidis eds., 2000) [hereinafter Hudec, Like Product] (speculating that the
"background to the claim appears to have been a typical case of reciprocity
discrimination-the classification of lumber by species of tree, resulting in more
favourable treatment of United States origin lumber, in response to a tariff concession
granted by Japan to the United States in a trade agreement bargain in which Canada
did not participate"); ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-
IMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 258 (2011) (discussing the case based on
Hudec's interpretation).
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be used to undermine negotiated tariff concessions," as complainants
could reclassify items "in order to gain an unbargained-for-
concession."' 110 By "attempting to build a case by establishing within
existing sub-positions of the Japanese Tariff sub-groups of goods with
a degree of similarity . . . so as to find allegedly 'like products' that
receive different tariff treatment," Canada was, in Japan's view,
"forcing Japan into a concession that had not been negotiated."'11
Japan warned of dire consequences for a system of tariff negotiations
based on payment if this approach was accepted, noting that
any moves to introduce tariff sub-classifications based on "end-use" criteria,
would have the result that negotiators, when considering a concession-request
on a given tariff position, would have to examine for "likeness", with the
product covered by the requested position, all other products covered under any
other tariff position, and, if there existed such "like" products, the negotiators
would then have to decide whether, or not, they would be in a position, and
willing, to grant the concession, bearing in mind reciprocity obligations and
other relevant desiderata and requirements. 
1 12
Other countries took the opposite view and warned of the
"dangers of allowing widespread abuse of the MFN clause through
'breaking out' a tariff line into numerous specialized and essentially
arbitrary categories."1 13 In this controversy, the conflict between the
MFN rule and the principle of payment that had given rise to the
principal supplier rule reappears in the tension between the
prohibition to discriminate between like products and the imperative
to concentrate the benefits of tariff concessions on those who are
paying for them.
The panel in Japan/Canada-Dimension Lumber recognized
tariff differentiation as a "legitimate means of trade policy," in that it
was a "legitimate means of adapting the tariff scheme to each
contracting party's trade policy interests, comprising both its
protection needs and its requirements for the purposes of tariff and
trade negotiations." 114 Robert Hudec reads these "rather opaque
110. L/6470, supra note 108, 3.20, at 180.
111. Id. 3.35 at 185.
112. Id. 3.32 at 184.
113. Id. 4.9 at 195 (describing New Zealand's observations and views on the
interpretation of "like products").
114. Id. 5.9-10 at 198. Other panels took a different view. See Report of the
Panel, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and
Alcoholic Beverages, 5.5(b), L/6216 (Oct. 13, 1987) GATT BISD (34th Supp.), at 113-
14 ("Just as Article I:1 was generally construed, in order to protect the competitive
benefits accruing from reciprocal tariff bindings, as prohibiting 'tariff specialization'
discriminating against 'like' products, only the literal interpretation of Article 111:2 as
prohibiting 'internal tax specialization' discriminating against 'like' products could
ensure that the reasonable expectation, protected under GATT Article XXIII, of
competitive benefits accruing under tariff concessions would not be nullified or
impaired by internal tax discrimination against like products."); see also Report of the
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references to the needs of tariff negotiations" as owing to the above-
mentioned tension, noting that "it was no doubt awkward for the
panel to acknowledge, in the face of all the fanfare proclaiming the
MFN obligation to be a 'cornerstone' of GATT policy, that
governments do need a bit of freedom to discriminate in tariff
negotiations."
115
Other authors have confirmed the importance of the product
selection facilitated by tariff differentiation for the success of tariff
negotiations. Hufbauer et al. note that, in tariff negotiations, "the
legal devotion to an unconditional most-favored-nation approach
often exceeded its economic substance." They speculate: "If 'product
selection' had not been available as a way around a strict MFN
approach, there would perhaps have been much less tariff cutting."
1 16
Product selection was indeed highly successful in concentrating the
benefits of trade liberalization among those who actively participated
in tariff negotiations. As Finger reports:
The participating countries with whom the United States exchanged
concessions at the Geneva 1947, Geneva 1956, Dillon, and Kennedy rounds
supplied in each case just under 70 percent of dutiable U.S. imports. At the
first of these rounds, judicious selection of products managed to internalize 84
percent of U.S. concessions, and by the Dillon Round product selection had
become a fine art, internalizing 96 percent of U.S. concessions.
1 17
In sum, product selection, both in its blatant (exemption of entire
sectors) and subtler (tariff differentiation) forms, played a significant
role in concentrating the benefits of trade negotiations among the
core countries. The exclusion of most policies other than tariffs from
the ambit of negotiations for most of the GATT's history proved to be
particularly problematic for developing countries and agricultural
exporters, who were unable to achieve reductions in the major trade
barriers facing their exports.
Panel, Spain-Tariff and Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, 4.4, L/5135 (June 11, 1981)
GATT BISD (28th Supp.), at 111 (1982) ("[The Panel found that there was no
obligation under the GATT to follow any particular system for classifying goods, and
that a contracting party had the right to introduce in its customs tariff new positions or
subpositions as appropriate ... however.., whatever the classification adopted,
Article :l required that the same tariff treatment be applied to 'like products."'). See
generally Hudec, Like Product, supra note 109, at 114-16 (analyzing the meaning of
"like product" in Japan/Canada-Dimension Lumber and Spain-Unroasted Coffee);
LANG, supra note 109, at 257-59 (developing Hudec's discussion).
115. Hudec, Like Product, supra note 109, at 114.
116. G.C. Hufbauer, J. Shelton Erb & H. P. Starr, The GATT Codes and the
Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 59, 67 n.39
(1980).
117. Finger, supra note 106, at 427.
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3. Who Needs to Agree: Critical Mass Approaches to Lawmaking
The dynamics described in the previous two sections were most
characteristic of trade negotiations in the first two decades of the
GATT's operation. The Kennedy Round in the 1960s brought two
major changes. First, negotiations on nontariff barriers started to
play a more prominent role. For a number of reasons, these
negotiations were not subject to the self-perpetuating club dynamic
that had characterized tariff negotiations. Thus, in negotiations on
nontariff barriers, there were no conventions akin to the principal
supplier rule that would have restricted who could request
concessions from their trading partners. Moreover, even though the
participants were still primarily interested in the practices of their
major trading partners, in negotiations on nontariff barriers all
countries potentially had something to offer, namely their consent to
multilateral rules-at least in those areas where multilateral
solutions, instead of bilateral accommodations, were sought. As
Winham has observed:
Once non-tariff measures and other issues came onto the agenda of GATT
negotiations-which occurred mainly at the Tokyo Round-developing
countries were less inhibited by their trade profiles and were more able to
make an impact on multilateral trade negotiations. In the negotiations over
trade rules or codes of behaviour, large and small nations start on a footing of
greater equality than they do in a tariff negotiation based wholly on the
respective trading performances of the participants. Economic power and
interest are still the principal variables in current GATT negotiations, but the
correlation between bargaining position and trade performance has diminished
and there is consequently greater scope for negotiating skill and perseverance
on the part of individual national delegations. 
11 8
Second, even the dynamics of tariff negotiations changed in the
Kennedy Round, at least superficially. The Kennedy Round was the
first negotiating round in which tariff reductions were supposed to be
achieved in accordance with a multilaterally-agreed formula, rather
than through bilateral bargains. This held out the prospect that less
economically powerful countries would not only profit from tariff
reductions on a wider range of products, but would also have a say in
the design of the reduction formula.
These developments ran counter to the club dynamic that had
characterized past GATT negotiations: from the perspective of the
core GATT countries, these changes posed precisely those dangers
that the club approach was designed to avoid. First, the active
participation of a wider range of countries in the negotiation of rules
and tariff formulas would make reaching agreement more difficult.
Second, in order to reach consensus under these circumstances, the
118. Winham, supra note 95, at 814.
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core countries might have to make substantial concessions to other
countries. Third, if agreement could not be reached and the core
countries decided to implement agreements among themselves, the
MFN obligation would make it hard to prevent the outsiders from
benefitting from the agreement, thus making it difficult to force them
to join it on the insiders' terms.
As the discussion in this subpart will demonstrate, the core
countries found mechanisms to replicate the club dynamic under the
changed circumstances in a way that addressed the first two
concerns, but did little to remedy the third. Thus, the use of a critical
mass approach to negotiations on nontariff barriers and tariff
formulas prevented potentially non-cooperative countries from
blocking agreement and from influencing the substance of the
agreement in ways that would be unacceptable to the core. Moreover,
the concentration of negotiating activity among a small group of core
countries that used to occur automatically through the principal
supplier rule was increasingly institutionalized in the form of
exclusive negotiating arrangements. None of these instantiations of
the club approach, however, allowed the core to internalize the
benefits of their agreements to the same extent as had been possible
under the traditional protocol of tariff negotiations.
Aside from the rules for the entry into force of the GATT
itself,119 one of the earliest examples of the use of a critical mass
approach in negotiations on nontariff measures was the adoption of
binding declarations containing additional obligations with regard to
subsidies. The original version of the GATT contained only reporting
and consultation requirements in Article XVI, a provision that had
been agreed under the assumption that the much more stringent
obligations contained in the ITO Charter would come into force
soon. 120
When the ITO Charter failed to enter into force, the contracting
parties decided, at the Review Session in 1955, to amend Article XVI
to include more specific obligations on export subsidies. The new
paragraph 4 of the provision envisaged that contracting parties would
cease to grant any form of export subsidies on non-primary products
"as from 1 January 1958 or the earliest practicable date
119. See GATT, supra note 3, art. XXVI, 6, which stipulates that the
agreement:
shall enter into force, as among the governments which have accepted it, on
the thirtieth day following the day on which instruments of acceptance have
been deposited with . . . [the Secretary-General of the United Nations] on
behalf of governments named in Annex H [i.e., signatory to the Final Act],
the territories of which account for 85 per centum of the total external trade
of the territories of such governments, computed in accordance with the
applicable column of percentages et forth therein. (emphasis added).
120. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 87, at 368-70; IRWIN ET AL., supra
note 36, at 156-58.
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thereafter." 121 This was supplemented by a standstill provision
whereby contracting parties would not extend existing subsidies or
introduce new subsidies in the meantime (i.e., up until 31 December
1957).122 An Interpretive Note clarified that the
intention of paragraph 4 is that the contracting parties should seek before the
end of 1957 to reach agreement to abolish all remaining subsidies as from 1
January 1958; or, failing this, to reach agreement to extend the application of
the standstill until the earliest date thereafter by which they can expect to
reach such agreement.
Since the contracting parties failed to reach agreement on the
abolition of all export subsidies on non-primary products by late 1957,
they adopted, on November 30, 1957, a declaration extending the
standstill provisions of Article XVI (4) for one year.123 Paragraph 4 of
the Declaration stipulated:
This Declaration shall enter into force on the day on which it will have been
accepted by the Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States
of America. 
124
The Declaration and a Proces-Verbale extending it for another
year entered into force on May 11, 1959, for those governments that
had signed them.12 5 In 1960, the contracting parties finally adopted a
"Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI, Paragraph
4," which contained a similar provision regarding the "critical mass"
of countries that had to accept it in order for it enter into force. Thus,
paragraph 2 of the Declaration read:
This Declaration shall enter into force, for each government which has accepted
it, on the thirtieth day following the day on which it shall have been accepted
by that government or on the thirtieth day following the day on which it shall
121. GATT, supra note 3, art. XVI(4).
122. See id., art. XVI(4).
123. Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of Article XVI4. Adopted
by the Contracting Parties on 30 November 1957, 11774 (Dec. 11, 1957); see also
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 87, at 373. The Declaration was extended twice.
See Proces-Verbal, Extending the Validity of the Declaration Extending the Standstill
Provisions of Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 12935 (Nov.
21, 1958); Subsides-Article XVL4, Proces-Verbal Further Ext ending the Validity of
the Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of Article XVI:4, 111121 (Dec. 9,
1959).
124. L1774, supra note 123, 4; see also Declaration Extending the Standstill
Provisions of Article XVI4. Note by the Executive Secretary, L/892 (Oct. 25, 1958)
(Contracting Parties, Thirteenth Session) (reporting on the status of acceptance of the
Declaration).
125. Proces-Verbal and Declaration Extending the Standstill Provisions of
Article XVI:4. Entry into Force, L/985 (May 15, 1959) (Contracting Parties, Fourteenth
Session).
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have been accepted by the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America, whichever is later. 126
Gallagher and Stoler have noted the implications of this
declaration:
At a time when forty-two governments were [contracting parties] to GATT, only
seventeen signed the declaration. The new obligations applied to the seventeen
signatories, but rights under Article XVI:4 accrued to all forty-two [contracting
parties]. Clearly, this apparent lack of reciprocity did not stop the seventeen
from signing on because they must have considered that they collectively
constituted a critical mass of [contracting parties] likely to engage in
meaningful export subsidies on industrial products. 127
The declarations on the standstill provision and the prohibition
on export subsidies on industrial products implemented on a critical
mass basis obligations that were envisaged in the (amended) GATT
itself. The Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code,128 however, marked
a new departure: the negotiation of a legally separate agreement
adding to GATT obligations but bypassing the amendment
procedures of the GATT. The resort to "codes" during the Kennedy
and Tokyo Rounds is often attributed to the difficulties of amending
the GATT. 12 9 The amendment provisions of the GATT, however,
foresaw that the GATT could be amended by a critical mass of
contracting parties. Pursuant to Article XXX, amendments to the
GATT (except to Part I, Article XXIX, and Article XXX itself, which
all required unanimity) would "become effective, in respect of those
contracting parties which accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds
of the contracting parties and thereafter for each other contracting
126. Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI.4, Nov. 19, 1960,
GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) (1961).
127. Peter Gallagher & Andrew Stoler, Critical Mass as an Alternative
Framework for Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 375, 384
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
128. The Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping code was an agreement negotiated
during the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations (1964-1967) that imposed additional
disciplines (beyond those provided by GATT art. VI) on the administration of anti-
dumping duties. The code is formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (June 30, 1967), GATT
B.I.S.D. (15th Supp.) [hereinafter Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code].
129. See, e.g., Gerard Curzon & Victoria Curzon, The Multi-Tier GATT System,
in THE NEW ECONOMIC NATIONALISM 137, 143 (Otto Hieronymi ed., 1980) ("[Tlhe
GATT started out with 23 contracting parties. It now has 83. They are incapable of
agreeing unanimously to change even a comma in the original agreement. How, then,
is GATT to change? The answer is to draw up codes. . . and to create a network of new
rights and obligations among the countries which accept them.")
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party upon acceptance by it." 130 However, the core countries
apparently found the threshold of two-thirds of the contracting party
too high and therefore opted for the negotiation of separate "codes,"
which could be brought into force by fewer parties.
131
The Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code did not even stipulate a
minimum threshold for acceptances for its entry into force. Article 13
simply provided that it would "enter into force on 1 July 1968 for each
party which has accepted it by that date."132 Of course, among the
states that had negotiated the code-principally member countries of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)-acceptance was informally contingent upon the acceptance
by the other participants (as well as the successful conclusion of the
Round as a whole).
The second agreement on nontariff barriers negotiated during
the Kennedy Round, regarding the elimination of the American
Selling Price (ASP) system of customs valuation, was explicitly
concluded among a limited group of countries, namely Belgium,
France, Italy, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and the European Economic Community. This agreement would enter
into force only if accepted by all those governments. 133
In both cases, the limited circle of parties who needed to agree
made it easier to reach an agreement and allowed those parties to
shape the content by themselves. It appears that in each case the
benefits were sufficiently concentrated among the participants so that
unrequited accidental benefits accruing to nonparticipants were not a
major concern.134 While the Anti-Dumping Code remained open to
130. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXX(1).
131. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 87, at 81 ("The difficulties of
getting GATT amendments into force have led GATT parties to seek other ways to
achieve their purposes .... [Tihe expedient of entering into a wholly separate treaty,
which specifies obligations relating to the GATT, has been used. This separate treaty
can be brought into force by as few parties as desire it-binding only them .... "); L.
Alan Winters, The Road to Uruguay, 100 ECON. J. 1288, 1294 (1990) ("Amending the
GATT requires the agreement of two-thirds of the members and so the new provisions
were embodied in an interpretive Anti-dumping Code, which the industrial country
contracting parties signed separately from their 'regular' GATT membership. This
plurilateral approach represented a major innovation in the development of
multilateral trading rules.") The precedential effect of the Anti-Dumping Code for
negotiations on other nontariff barriers is also noted by KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT:
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 175 (1970).
132. Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 128, art. 13, at 34.
133. Agreement Relating Principally to Chemicals, Supplementary to the
Geneva (1967) Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (June 26, 1967),
GATT B.I.S.D. (15th Supp.), art. 12, at 10 [hereinafter ASP Agreement].
134. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 87, at 410 ("Because of the MFN
clause in Article I of GATT, it obligates parties to that code, even in their actions
toward GATT contracting parties who are not code parties-an interesting
circumstance of nonreciprocity."); see also Agreement on Implementation of Article VI.
Note by the Director-General, L13149 (Nov. 29, 1968).
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signature by -additional parties,135 the only obvious incentive would
be the opportunity to participate in the Committee set up pursuant to
Article 17 of the Agreement. However, John Jackson notes a more
subtle way in which the Code could affect nonparties. Given that "the
code is worded as an 'interpretation' of Article VI of GATT, its
provisions could, over time, be accepted as the definite interpretation
of GATT, thus binding all GATT parties."'136 Again, the outsiders
would thus ultimately join the insiders on the insiders' terms.
137
Such multilateralization by stealth only had prospects of success as
long as participation in the codes was not openly politicized-which
may have been true for the Kennedy Round, but was no longer true
for the Tokyo Round, as the following discussion demonstrates.
In the early 1970s, the "tight little club of the 1950s was
gone,"138 and the negotiation of codes with participation of a critical
mass of countries became the dominant modus operandi of the Tokyo
Round. 13 9 At the same time, the limits of implementing the club
approach through the use of critical mass became more evident in the
Tokyo Round. At the conclusion of the Round, the developed countries
were confronted with rival codes and amendments proposed by
developing countries, with demands that only codes adopted by the
Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) with a two-thirds majority
could enter into force, and (at least partially successful) resistance
against the conditional-MFN elements of the codes.140 Moreover, the
negotiation of the one code on which the cooperation of developing
countries was essential, the safeguards code, ended in failure. 
141
135. See Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 128, art. 13, at 34
("This Agreement shall be open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by
contracting parties to the General Agreement and by the European Economic
Community.").
136. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE, supra note 87, at 410.
137. In a similar vein, Gallagher and Stoler argue that the critical mass
approach to the bringing into effect of GATT Article XVI:4 proved to be "a successful
path to disciplining export subsidies" on the basis of, inter alia, "its plurilateral
extension through the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code and, eventually, to all WTO
members at the end of the Uruguay Round." Gallagher & Stoler, supra note 127, at
384.
138. Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons
of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1507 (1988).
139. See Winters, supra note 131, at 1296 ("Mhe practice of separate but
parallel Codes was re-affirmed and plurilateralism accepted.").
140. By contrast to the unconditional MFN principle contained in GATT art. 1.1,
which obliged GATT parties to extent any trade benefit granted to any other country to
all GATT contracting parties, a conditional MFN principle would only oblige a party to
a code to extend the benefits of the code to other GATT contracting parties who were
also parties to the code. This principle is conditional in the sense that MFN benefits are
only extended on the condition that the other party reciprocate in kind.
141. For background, see WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23, at 197-200.
For an account of the failure of the negotiations, see id. 240-47.
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The Tokyo Round was from the outset driven by the United
States, in conjunction with the European Community and Japan.
142
In 1973, the United States issued joint statements with the European
Community (EC) and Japan, respectively, declaring their intention to
initiate a new round of trade negotiations. 143 While the other
developed GATT parties welcomed this initiative, developing
countries were more skeptical and "made it clear that their
association with the undertakings was conditional upon the details to
be applied to their participation including the techniques and
modalities to be worked out for the negotiations."'144 In an internal
memorandum, U.S. negotiators reported criticism of the draft
declaration launching the Tokyo Round by some developing countries,
noting that "such discordant notes," if repeated at the Tokyo
Ministerial, would be "regrettable," but
should not interfere with the basic objective which is approval of the
declaration by the countries which are planning meaningful participation in
the forthcoming negotiations. There is no requirement for any country to
participate, and the election not to participate by a few developing countries
will not affect the approval of the declaration. 
1 4 5
In effect, the entire Tokyo Round proceeded from the outset on a
critical mass basis. 146 This allowed the developed countries,
particularly the United States and the EC, to "essentially
negotiat[e] ... among themselves"14 7 and thereby realize the first two
142. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, VOLUME XXXI,
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, 1973-1976, at 591 [hereinafter FRUS 1973-1976] (noting
that in 1971 "the European Community and Japan, at our urging, agreed that
multilateral trade negotiations should begin in 1973").
143. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, THE TOKYO ROUND OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GATT
21 (1979); WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23, at 93; see Joint Japan-United
States Statement on International Economic Relations-9 February 1972, L/3669 (Feb.
10, 1972); Joint European Community-United States Declaration-11 February 1972,
L3670 (Feb. 11, 1972). OXLEY, supra note 23, at 159, comments:
The driving forces in the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations had been the
United States and the other three quadrilaterals. The objectives for the
Tokyo Round were prepared following discussions among the United States,
Japan and the European Community. They announced that the negotiations
were to begin and everyone else was invited to participate.
144. Ministerial Meeting, Report of Preparatory Committee for Trade
Negotiations, WTO Doc. MIN(73)W/2 (Aug. 7, 1973) at 2.
145. FRUS 1973-1976, supra note 142, at 682.
146. See Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, supra note 116, at 67 (noting with respect to
the negotiations on nontariff barriers in the Tokyo Round that "[flrom the beginning of
the Tokyo Round it was clear that not all GATT members would accept this extension
of international discipline").
147. See Consultative Group of Eighteen, Note on the Eighth Meeting of the
Consultative Group of Eighteen, 12-13 October 1978, CG.1818 (Nov. 17, 1978), 17
(reporting that at a meeting of the Consultative Group of 18 held in 1978, one
participant noted that "the developing countries did not know what to expect from the
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benefits of the club approach-facilitating agreement and shaping the
content of that agreement decisively. At the same time, the United
States and the EC became more reluctant than they had been in the
Kennedy Round to forego the third element of the club approach-
forcing outsiders to join the agreement on the insiders' terms-by
extending the benefits of that agreement to nonparticipants, as
required by the unconditional MFN clause of the GATT. Hence, for
the first time in the history of the GATT, formal conditional MFN was
openly considered as an element of the new "codes."14 8 The report of
the preparatory commission for the Tokyo Round negotiations noted
the suggestion by "some delegations" that "the negotiations on certain
non-tariff measures should be conducted on the basis that the
benefits would accrue only to countries that are parties to the
resulting arrangement." 149 The EC in particular had openly
embraced conditional MFN as the basis for the code negotiations.
150
From the outset, the developing countries announced their opposition
to this development.
15 1
During the preparatory phase of the Tokyo Round, negotiations
had already substantially advanced on a "Standards Code."152 The
Tokyo Round since the developed countries were essentially negotiating among
themselves") (alteration in original).
148. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing Countries, 1 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 67, 74 (1992) [hereinafter Hudec, GAT'] ("[T]he U.S. and the EC both declared
during the course of the negotiations that they would refuse to give the benefits of the
newly drafted codes to those countries that would not sign them. This signalled the
beginning of conditional MFN treatment."); Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, supra note 116, at
67 (footnote omitted) ("[T]he major nations that were willing to accept meaningful
international measures demanded that such discipline apply equally to their trading
partners. In order to ensure this international quid pro quo, the Tokyo Round
established the principle of conditional MFN as the centerpiece of its work-the six
Codes governing nontariff barriers.")
149. MIN(73)W/2, supra note 144, 23. A statement to this effect was included
in all drafts of the report.
150. Development of an Overall Approach to Trade in View of the Coming
Multilateral Negotiations in GATT, COM (73) 556 (Sept. 15, 2013) (Memorandum from
the Commission to the Council), at 8 ('Che solutions arrived at [on nontariff barriers,
N.L.] should be accepted by as many countries as possible if the existing imbalance
between the various contracting parties is not to be worsened. It should therefore be
made clear that any advantages which might derive from solutions comprising
obligations going beyond the present GATT rules would be reserved for countries which
in practice abide by these solutions (conditional application of the most-favoured-
nation clause").). Winham notes that "while this went against the usual American
support for the principle of nondiscrimination, it was an approach that gained wide
acceptance in the subsequent NTM negotiations." WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note
23, at 82. On the U.S. position, see Walter Kolligs, The United States Law of
Countervailing Duties and Federal Agency Procurement After the Tokyo Round: Is It
"GATT Legal' ?, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 553, 555, n. 7 (1990).
151. See MIN(73)W/2, supra note 144, 23 ("Delegations from developing
countries have stressed that all concessions resulting from the negotiations should be
extended to them unconditionally.").
152. See Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sub-Group 'Technical Barriers to
Trade", Standards; Packaging and Labelling; Marks of Origin. Background Note by the
Secretariat, MTN/NTM/W/5 (Apr. 21, 1975), 7 ("During the preparatory phase of the
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working group that drafted the code had worked "on the hypothesis
that benefits under the Code would accrue as of right solely to other
adherents, without these benefits having to be extended to
contracting parties which did not adhere to the Code." 153 This
hypothesis did not extend only to the Code itself, but also to
"multilateral schemes for assuring conformity to mandatory or quasi-
mandatory standards" contemplated under the Code.154 In the first
draft considered by the working group, the hypothesis was inter alia
reflected in a provision stipulating that such schemes "should not
include any provisions which would prevent individual members from
accepting assurances of conformity provided by non-participating
countries, except where the non-participation of such countries is due
to unwillingness to accept the obligations of membership."' 15 5 The
provision was accompanied by a note that "this somewhat tortuous
phraseology is designed to make these schemes as 'liberal' as possible,
but at the same time to discourage attempts to obtain the benefits of
membership without accepting the corresponding obligations." 156
While the provision was later dropped, it indicates the spirit in which
the negotiations proceeded.
The draft standards code that was ultimately forwarded to the
Tokyo Round negotiating group on technical barriers to trade
contained an explicit "critical mass" provision stating that it would
enter into force after an as yet unspecified number of contracting
parties ("[x]"), "including those listed in Annex 2," had ratified it.
15 7
Annex 2 was still "[to be added]" at this stage, but there proved to be
little enthusiasm for doing so in subsequent negotiating sessions.158
The provision does not appear in the final version of the Code. By all
indications, there was an informal understanding between the United
States and the EC that both would ratify the Code, and they were
negotiations, a large measure of agreement was reached, on an ad referendum basis, on
the text of a proposed GATT Code of Conduct for Preventing Technical Barriers to
Trade (often referred to as 'the Standards Code').").
153. Committee on Trade in Industrial Products: Group 3 on Standards,
COM.IND/W/108 (June 25, 1973), 8. The report of the Working Group, including the
draft code, is also attached to MTN/NTMW/5, supra note 152.
154. Note by the United Kingdom Delegation, Draft GATT Code of Conduct
Regarding Standards Which May Act as Technical Barriers to Trade, Spec(71)39 (May
14, 1971), at 18-20.
155. Id. at 19.
156. Id.
157. MTN/NTMJW/5, supra note 152, app. 1, art. 22(a)(i) of the Draft Code.
158. See Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Group "Non-Tariff Measures", Sub-
Group on Technical Barriers to Trade, Issues Raised and Suggestions Made at May
Meeting of Sub-Group, MTN/NTMW/12 (July 10, 1975), at 7 ("The Sub-Group noted
that it would, at some stage, have to discuss the provisions in the text relating to
minimum participation and key countries.").
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presumably unwilling to jeopardize the entry into force of the Code by
making it contingent on the accession of other parties. 1
5 9
This solution to the "critical mass" question was facilitated by
the fact that, by its terms, the Code provided benefits only to those
who were "Parties" to it, 16 0 which created an incentive for other
contracting parties to join. In the case of the Standards Code, these
benefits were not primarily substantive. Thus, many of the provisions
of the code merely elaborate the national treatment obligation to
which the parties were subject in any case with respect to all GATT
contracting parties pursuant to Article III:4 of the GATT. Rather, the
benefits were procedural: the Code created new notification
requirements that only applied with respect to other parties to the
Code, and only parties were members in the Committee established
pursuant to the Code. 161
While the Standards Code was thus, like all other Tokyo Round
codes, "conditional in important procedural respects," 162 the
Subsidies and Government Procurement codes "fully embrace[d] the
conditional MFN principle in their substantive elements"16 3 in that,
by their terms, they provided substantive benefits to signatories that
were not enjoyed by other contracting parties to the GATT. Thus,
while GATT Article 111:8 exempts government procurement from the
scope of the national treatment obligation of the GATT, the
Government Procurement Code provided for national treatment of
"products and suppliers of other Parties" with respect to government
procurement covered by the agreement. 164
Similarly, the Subsidies Code imposed more stringent disciplines
than the GATT on the use of subsidies that cause injury to the
domestic industry-or serious prejudice to the interests-of "another
signatory."16 5 Moreover, Article 1 of the Subsidies Code stipulated
159. Thus, explicitly including a country in the list of "critical mass" countries
would give that country leverage by allowing it to block the coming into force of the
Code. Conversely, excluding a country from the list of "critical mass" countries might
have taken the pressure off that country to join the Code, which would undermine the
third element of the club approach.
160. Earlier drafts of the Code use the term "adherents" instead of "Parties,"
see e.g., COM.INDJW/108, supra note 153, Annex.
161. Hulbauer, Erb & Starr, supra note 116, at 68 (noting that each of the
Tokyo Round codes "establishes a committee of signatories to resolve substantive and
technical questions relating to Code operation").
162. Id.
163. Id. at 69.
164. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D.
(26th Supp.), art. II, at 33 [hereinafter Government Procurement Code].
165. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.), art. 8, at 56 [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
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that the imposition of countervailing duties166 "on any product of the
territory of any signatory imported into the territory of another
signatory" had to be in accordance with the provisions of GATT
Article VI as well as the Code. The most significant practical effect of
this provision was that the United States could impose countervailing
duties on subsidized imports from other signatories only after
determining that these imports were causing "material injury" to its
domestic industry-a requirement of GATT Article VI from which the
United States was exempt with respect to the contracting parties of
the GATT because its countervailing duty law, which did not require
such a determination, predated the adoption of the GATT.
167
The developing countries resisted both aspects of the club
approach adopted by the United States and the EC in the Tokyo
Round-critical mass negotiations and unconditional MFN-from the
outset. Their first line of defense was to prevent the adoption of
agreements on a critical mass basis within the framework of the
Tokyo Round negotiations. At a meeting of the Trade Negotiations
Committee in July 1978, Yugoslavia, speaking "on behalf of the
developing countries," stated:
At this stage we are requesting that a rule be established for the decision-
making process in the MTN [multilateral trade negotiations, N.L.] according to
which no adoption of a negotiating document would be accepted unless the
large majority of participants declared themselves in favour of it. We cannot
proceed on the basis that a group of a few countries may consider it appropriate
for others to be kept out of arrangements if they are not in a position to accept
their conceptual approach. 168
The developing countries were concerned that the critical mass
approach was allowing the developed countries to develop the law
without feeling the need to bring the developing countries on board.
While the developing countries found it "understandable for there to
be, in the process of negotiation, many stages and many bilateral and
multilateral consultations," they saw these "as a technique for
166. Countervailing duties are tariffs imposed on imports that are believed to
be subsidized in order to neutralize the effect of the subsidization.
167. The Protocol of Provisional Application, pursuant to which the GATT had
been put into effect, only obliged the contracting parties to implement the provisions of
Part II of the GATT "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." See
Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, 1(b).
168. Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Trade Negotiations Committee,
Statement Made by the Delegate of Yugoslavia on Behalf of the Developing Countries on
3 July 1978, MTN/W/35 (July 6, 1978), at 1. Developing countries were also concerned
that the code approach circumvented the amendment provisions of the GATT. Thus,
Yugoslavia noted that "whenever amendments are made in the General Agreement,
the CONTRACTING PARTIES have to approve them according to the existing rules."
For background, see Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 357 (2002).
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reaching universally acceptable solutions,"169 not as a way for small
groups of countries to conclude agreements among themselves.
The developing countries kept up their resistance to the critical
mass approach until the very end of the Tokyo Round negotiations.
They attempted to amend the final drafts of the codes to the effect
that they would only be open for acceptance "after adoption by the
Trade Negotiations Committee."170 This would have given developing
countries a chance to prevent those codes that did not adequately
reflect their interests from entering into force at all and would thus
have given them leverage to effect changes in the codes. An
alternative proposal advanced at the conclusion of the negotiations,
which would have had a similar effect, was that the codes "should
enter into force when two thirds of the participants in the MTN have
accepted them."
' 171
The question of whether an agreement among a subset of GATT
contracting parties could only be concluded with the consent of all
contracting parties went to the heart of what kind of institution the
GATT was. In the developing countries' view, the Trade Negotiations
Committee "could only proceed on the basis of consensus";17 2 the
addition of any new body of law to the GATT framework required a
positive consensus of the membership, even if only a subset of
members would subscribe to it. In contrast to this collectivist
conception of the GATT, the developed countries took the view that
the MTN was not a general diplomatic conference, that no agreement was
being forced on any government but that on the other hand the Committee
could not prevent a number of countries from entering into an agreement if
they wished to, unless the provisions of the agreement were contrary to the
GATT.
17 3
These developed governments, then, viewed the GATT as a collection
of bilateral or plurilateral contracts. Subsets of members who wished
to enter into such contracts were free to do so as long as they "were
not imposing anything on other governments but simply moving to
higher levels of discipline.'174 Apart from consistency with the GATT,
there was no substantive constraint on the content of bilateral or
plurilateral agreements, such as would exist if they were subject to
approval by the contracting parties as a whole. It was unsurprising
that the developed countries took this view, as it was only under this
169. MTN/W/35, supra note 168, at 4.
170. See Trade Negotiations Committee, Proceedings of the Session. Held in the
International Labour Office, Geneva, 11 and 12 April 1979, WTO Doc. MTN/P/5 (July 9,
1979), at 2(d).
171. Id. at 2(e).
172. Id. 1 14.
173. Id.
174. Id. 19.
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conception of the GATT that the conclusion of critical mass
agreements, and thus the realization of the first two benefits of the
club approach-the greater ease of reaching agreement among a
small group and the opportunity to shape the content of that
agreement decisively-could be realized.
The developed countries' view prevailed by default, as there was
no consensus to add the language suggested by the developing
countries to the draft codes. As one of the developing countries
complained, a "precedent" was "now set for various groups of
countries to put up Agreements amongst themselves and to seek the
umbrella of the MTN."
175
The developing countries' second line of defense was directed
against the third element of the club approach-the attempt of the
developed countries to force the developing countries to join the codes
on the formers' terms by limiting the benefits of the codes to code
signatories through conditional MFN. The developing countries were,
at least partially, successful in this area.176 On November 28, 1979,
the contracting parties adopted a decision entitled "Action by the
Contracting Parties on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations," in which
they "reaffirm[ed] their intention to ensure the unity and consistency
of the GATT system," noted that "existing rights and benefits under
the GATT . . . , including those derived from Article IF of
nonsignatories to the codes, were "not affected" by the codes, and
expressed their expectation that nonsignatories would be regularly
informed on developments regarding the codes and able to follow the
proceedings of the code committees "in an observer capacity."1 77 This
decision made it clear that, the language of the codes
notwithstanding, the contracting parties expected the benefits of the
175. Id. at 62.
176. In Steinberg's view, they were completely successful with regard to the
Subsidies Code and the revised Anti.Dumping Code. Steinberg, supra note 168, at 357
("[T]he developing countries received all of the rights to the subsidies code and the anti-
dumping code, but they were not obligated to sign or otherwise abide by the obligations
contained in those agreements"). By contrast, it appears that it was accepted that the
Government Procurement Code would operate on a conditional MFN basis. Thus,
India, which was one of the key proponents of the view that the benefits of the
Subsidies Code had to be extended on an MFN basis, reportedly accepted that it had to
negotiate its accession to the Government Procurement Code. See Richard H.
Steinberg, Consensus Decision-Making at the GATT and WTO: Linkage and Law in a
Neorealist Model of Institutions 20-23 (Working Paper 72, 1995) [hereinafter
Steinberg, Consensus Decision-Making] (discussing the strategy of developing
countries in the code negotiations). For the view that government procurement is
exempted from the MFN obligation, see id. at 20 and ROBERT E. HUDEc, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 97, n. 26 (1987) [hereinafter HUDEC,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES]. For the argument that the MFN obligation of the GATT
obliged the parties to the Government Procurement Code to extend the benefits of the
code to nonsignatories, see Kolligs, supra note 150.
177. Action by the Contracting Parties on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations:
Decision of 28 November 1979, LU4905 (Dec. 3, 1979).
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codes to be extended to all contracting parties on the basis of the
MFN obligation in GATT Article 1.178 While there was no similar
legal basis for the procedural rights of nonsignatories envisaged in
the decision, the contracting parties' administrative and budgetary
control of the GATT Secretariat provided them with at least some
leverage in this regard.
179
Despite these decisions at the GATT level, the U.S. Congress
refused to implement the Subsidies and Government Procurement
codes on an MFN basis.180 In the case of the Subsidies Code, the
United States was unwilling to extend the benefits of its new
countervailing duty law to those who would not pay for it with
increased discipline on their subsidy practices. The United States'
implementing legislation denied the Code's benefits not only to
nonsignatories of the Code, but also to developing countries that
made use of the flexibility provided by Article 14.5181 not to eliminate
export subsidies on non-primary products.182 To this end, the United
States invoked the "non-application" clause of the agreement against
178. Again, it is not clear that this applied to the Government Procurement
Code.
179. See Steinberg, supra note 168, at 357 ("[Tlhe GATT secretariat could not
provide services to administer a code without a consensus of the Contracting Parties.");
see also Steinberg, Consensus Decision-Making, supra note 176, at 21 (reporting an
attempt by India and Nigeria to leverage the fact that "the GATT secretariat's
administration of the code would need developing country support" to press for the
inclusion of special and differential treatment provisions in the Government
Procurement Code).
180. For an extensive discussion, see Kolligs, supra note 150, at 575-89. It
appears that other developed countries applied the codes, with the exception of the
Government Procurement code, on an MFN basis. See HUDEc, DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 176, at 89.
181. Art. 14.5 of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code provided that "[a] developing
country should endeavour to enter into a commitment to reduce or eliminate export
subsidies when the use of such export subsidies is inconsistent with its competitive and
development needs." Subsidies Code, supra note 165, at 51. A footnote specified that
the "commitment" had to be notified to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (SCM Committee). Id. at 69.
182. As the U.S. representative clarified at a meeting of the SCM Committee:
The United States' position was that it could extend the benefits of
an injury test in its law only to those countries that had undertaken
increased discipline in the subsidies area. In the case of developing
countries, this meant that the United States could only apply its
new countervailing duty law to those developing countries that had
undertaken commitments with regard to their export subsidy
practices .... [While he in no way contested the right of any
country to sign this code without the commitments he had referred
to, his Government would find it impossible to apply their new law
to imports from developing countries which did not provide
commitments.
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Minutes of the Meeting Held on
8May 1980, GATT Doc. SCMJM/3, at 3, 11 (June 27, 1980).
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developing countries that did not enter into commitments that the
United States found satisfactory. 183
When the United States subsequently proceeded to impose
countervailing duties on industrial fasteners from India without
applying an injury test, India requested consultations and eventually
the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article XXIII of the
GATT. 184 In its panel request, India questioned whether the
nonapplication clause could be "validly invoked by any Party with the
objective of obtaining concessions from another Party to the
Agreement which are not envisaged in the provisions and go beyond
the balance of rights and obligations contained in the Agreement."
18 5
In effect, India argued that the nonapplication clause could not be
used to force outsiders to join the Subsidies Code on the insiders'
terms. India further argued that the United States' refusal to apply
an injury test in the countervailing duty investigation of India's
exports violated the MFN principle in Article I of the GATT. 186 To
support its argument, India relied inter alia on the contracting
parties' above mentioned decision, which had confirmed that the
GATT Article I rights of nonsignatories were "not affected" by the
183. See Subsidies Code, supra note 165, art. 19.9 (preventing the application of
the agreement "as between any two signatories if either of the signatories, at the time
either accepts or accedes to this Agreement, does not consent to such application.") For
the notification of the invocation of the non-application clause with respect to India, see
Communication from the United States, United States-Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XV1 and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade Done at Geneva on 12 April 1979, GATT Doc. Let/159 (Aug. 27, 1980) ("[T]he
United States does not consent to the application of the aforementioned Agreement
between the United States and India and therefore does not consider itself to be bound
by any of the obligations of the Agreement with respect to India.").
184. See Consultations Under Article XXIII:I, Request by India, India-
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Done at Geneva on 12 April 1979, GATT Doc.
L/5028 (Sept. 29, 1980); United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duty Without
Injury Criterion/Industrial Fasteners Imported From India, Recourse to Article XXIII2
by India, GATT Doc. L/5062 (Oct. 31, 1980) [hereinafter L/5062] (India's panel
request); see also HUDEc, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 176, at 88-89 (reporting
that, in response to India's complaint, the United States "backed away and settled by
granting Subsidy Code benefits to India on the same easy terms offered to Pakistan");
Kolligs, supra note 15050, at 579 (same); Steinberg, supra note 168, at 358, n. 97;
WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23, at 359-60.
185. L/5062, supra note 184, at 3, 3(c). India referred in this respect to the
GATT Secretariat, Report of the Working Party on Article XXXV Review, GATT Doc.
L/1545 (Sept. 6, 1961), at 5, which had suggested that the contracting parties might
want to "dispel the idea" that non-application "could legitimately by used as a
bargaining lever for gaining privileges or advantages over and above those provided for
in the General Agreement." India noted that this conclusion had been "endorsed by the
then US representative in unequivocal terms." L15062, supra note 184, at 3.
186. L/5062, supra note 184, at 3, 3(e).
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codes.187 Eventually, the United States gave in and agreed to apply
the provisions of the Subsidies Code in relation to India. 188
4. Who Gets to Be in the Room: From the Bridge Club to the Green
Room
Throughout the history of the GATT, the club approach to trade
lawmaking was implemented through exclusive negotiating
arrangements. In the first two decades of the GATT's operation, the
Tariff or Trade Negotiations Committee (i.e., the GATT body
overseeing the negotiations) was an exclusive body whose
membership was limited to those contracting parties which engaged
in tariff negotiations on a reciprocal basis. Starting in the Kennedy
Round, as membership of the Trade Negotiations Committee became
more inclusive, the core countries started to use other, more informal
meetings to maintain control of the negotiations.
The question of who could be a member in the Trade
Negotiations Committee overseeing a trade negotiation was for the
first time openly contested in the Kennedy Round. 189 At the
Ministerial Meeting during which the decision to launch the Kennedy
Round negotiations was taken, ministers from some developing
countries raised the question of "how the membership of the
Committee would be decided and whether the less-developed
countries would be adequately represented." 190 The Executive
Secretary, Eric Wyndham-White, reminded the ministers that "in
past negotiations the tariff negotiations committee had been
composed solely of the countries which took part in the negotiations"
and that "[i]t would be inappropriate to provide for a trade
negotiations committee which would include countries not
participating in any way in the trade negotiations."
' 191
It was clear to all involved that the kind of "participation" in
trade negotiations that had been required in the past to entitle a
contracting party to membership in the Trade Negotiations
Committee was a readiness to engage in reciprocal tariff reductions.
However, this notion was becoming increasingly problematic. Over
the years preceding the Kennedy Round, the GATT had been focusing
187. Id. at 4, 1 3(f). For the decision, see supra note 178.
188. See HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 176, at 89. India's request
to terminate proceedings is in United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duty
Without Injury Criterion/Industrial Fasteners Imported From India, Recourse to
Article XXIII:2 by India, Request for Termination of Proceedings, GATT Doc.
L/5062/Add.1 (Sept. 30, 1981).
189. See GATT Secretariat, Summary Record of the Meeting. Held at the Palais
des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday 21 May 1963, GATT Doc. MIN(63)SR, at 4-7 (May 21,
1963), [hereinafter MIN(63)SR].
190. Id. at 4.
191. Id. at 5-6.
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increasingly on the trade problems of the less developed countries,
particularly within the framework of the program for the expansion of
international trade. One of the principles that had gained increasing
acceptance in the run-up to the Kennedy Round was the principle of
nonreciprocity for developing countries. In fact, the very resolution
that provided for the establishment of the Trade Negotiations
Committee and that the ministers were debating at the 1963
Ministerial Meeting announced, as one of the principles of the
upcoming negotiations, that "every effort shall be made to reduce
barriers to exports of the less-developed countries, but that the
developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less-
developed countries."192 As a result, it appeared to some developing
countries that the notion of "participation" as readiness to engage in
reciprocal concessions was becoming increasingly anachronistic.
Thus, the Malaysian minister "enquired whether the less-developed
countries could be considered as 'negotiating"' since they were not
asked to offer reciprocal concessions, and the Indian minister, after
noting the manifold ways in which the developing countries had a
stake in the upcoming negotiations, stated, "It could not be
considered therefore that reciprocal action on tariff cuts would be the
only contribution which various parts of the world hoped to make
towards the expansion of world trade."
19 3
In order to deal with the tension between the traditional
understanding of "participation" in GATT negotiations and the
GATT's newfound concern for the trade interests of developing
countries, the United States, which had drafted the resolution under
discussion, came up with what the Indian minister described as "a
somewhat complex procedure,"194 whereby a special committee of the
Trade Negotiations Committee would be set up. In this special
committee, "the less-developed countries together with the developed
countries could discuss and agree upon the terms for
participation."195 As the Executive Secretary noted, "the implications
of the word 'negotiating' would be one of the interesting questions"
that the committee "might consider." 196 In other words, the
committee was to perform a gatekeeping function by setting
conditions for the participation of developing countries in the
192. GATT Secretariat, Arrangements for the Reduction or Elimination of
Tariffs and Other Barriers to Trade, and Related Matters and Measures for Access to
Markets for Agricultural and Other Primary Products. Resolution Adopted on 21 May
1963, GATT Doc. MIN(63)9, at A.8. (May 22, 1963) [hereinafter MIN(63)9].
193. MIN(63)SR, supra note 189, at 6.
194. Id. at 5.
195. Id. at 5-6 (recording the explanation given by the Executive Secretary).
The establishment of the committee is foreseen in paragraph B 3(f) of the draft
resolution contained in MIN(63)4 (this document is not preserved). The final version of
the resolution, from which the paragraph is deleted, is in MIN(63)9, supra note 192.
196. MIN(63)SR, supra note 189, at 7.
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Kennedy Round negotiations. The Executive Secretary attempted to
frame the committee as an effort to facilitate the participation of
developing countries in the Kennedy Round, noting that
if these countries were in doubt because they could not form a judgement as to
the conditions of such participation, having regard to their development
problems, it was at least reasonable to make provision whereby there could be
some discussion of the question before they made up their minds whether or
not they were going to participate actively in the negotiations, and therefore to
seek membership of the Trade Negotiations Committee itself.
19 7
The obvious alternative would have been not to make participation in
the trade negotiations subject to "conditions" that could potentially
create difficulties for the developing countries in light of their
"development problems." India clearly saw this, and its proposal to
delete the reference to the committee from the ministerial resolution,
on the basis that "every country which would be participating in the
negotiations would be doing so in a way consonant with its economic
development needs,"198 was eventually accepted. The preparatory
phase of the Kennedy Round, then, saw the last rearguard action to
defend the Trade Negotiations Committee as a body "tied to action"
(to use the words of the U.S. delegate at the Havana Conference19 9).
However, that was not the end of the debate over "participation"
in the Kennedy Round. The Executive Secretary, who was also
Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, continued to express
his "understanding" that those contracting parties that had notified
their intention to participate in the work of the Trade Negotiations
Committee "intended to take an active part in the trade negotiations
in the sense of being prepared to make a contribution."20 0 However,
membership in the Trade Negotiations Committee was formally open
to any contracting party that requested to become a member, and
there was thus no way to police the Executive Secretary's
"understanding." To remedy this problem, the core countries simply
proceeded to de-couple the status of a "full participant" in the
negotiations from membership in the Trade Negotiations Committee.
The status of a "full participant" and the attendant privileges, in
turn, remained "tied to action" (i.e., to a readiness to engage in (at
least some) reciprocal reduction of trade barriers).
In June 1963, the Trade Negotiations Committee decided to
establish a Sub-Committee on the Participation of Less-Developed
Countries to consider "any special problems relating to the
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See supra text accompanying note 80.
200. Trade Negotiations Committee, Proceedings of the First Meeting. Held at
the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 27 June 1963, at 2.30 p.m., GATT Doc.
TN.64/SR.1, at 1 (July 2, 1963).
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participation of less-developed countries in the trade negotiations."
20 1
It soon became clear that this committee would be quite similar to the
special committee envisaged in paragraph B 3(f) of the draft
resolution considered at the 1963 Ministerial Meeting, the reference
to which had been deleted at the suggestion of India. The first hint
that the new Sub-Committee on the Participation of Less-Developed
Countries was a kind of reincarnation of the "gatekeeping committee"
that the developing countries thought they had dispensed with during
the preparatory negotiations was a remark by the United States that
the committee would be "charged with establishing the basis for the
participation of the less-developed countries in the negotiations."
20 2
The United States added that this "could be done in a pragmatic way
so that the basis for participation would be in line with ground rules
as they evolved.'20 3 The U.S. representative's reference to "evolving"
ground rules spooked some of the developing countries,20 4 which
considered the question of ground rules, as least as far as the
principle of nonreciprocity was concerned, to have been settled.
2 5
Over the course of the discussions in the Sub-Committee on the
Participation of the Less-Developed Countries, the link between
"participation" and reciprocity, which the developing countries
believed had been severed in the preparatory negotiations, began to
re-emerge in the guise of a "contribution" that developing countries
were expected to make to the trade negotiations to be considered as
"full participants."20 6 Thus, in response to questions, the Chairman
clarified that "a less-developed country could be said to be
participating in the trade negotiations when it played its part
drawing up the ground rules for these negotiations, and when it
201. Trade Negotiations Committee, Proceedings of the Second Meeting. Held at
the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 19-20 September, 1963, GATT Doc. TN.64/SR.2, at 3
(Oct. 4, 1963). See the TN.64[LDC/ series of documents for records of the Sub-
Committee's communications. E.g. Trade Negotiations Committee, Sub-Committee on
the Participation of the Less-Developed Countries, Note by the Secretariat on the Third
Meeting of the Sub-Committee on 17 December 1964, GATT Doc. TN.64/LDC/27 (Dec.
28, 1964) [hereinafter TN.64/LDC/27].
202. Trade Negotiations Committee, Report of the Sub-Committee on the
Participation of the Less-Developed Countries to the Trade Negotiations Committee,
GATT Doc. TN.64/21, at 6, 20 (Apr. 30, 1964) [hereinafter TN.64/21].
203. Id.
204. Id. at 7, 26 (recording Brazil as noting that "it would be difficult for the
less-developed countries to express their willingness to participate in the trade
negotiations before the ground rules had been elaborated.").
205. Id. at 14-15, 50 (recording India as noting that "[m]inisters had agreed
at their meeting of May 1963 that the developed countries could not expect to receive
reciprocity from the less-developed countries; it was not open for the Sub-Committee to
re-examine this matter."); see also id. at 15, 57 (recording Argentina as noting that
"the Ministerial Decision made it perfectly clear that less-developed countries would
not be expected to give full reciprocity in the forthcoming trade negotiations.").
206. Id. at 4, 13-15.
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contributed to the negotiations."20 7 The United States acknowledged
that, given that the "ground rules" were still to be established, "it was
hardly possible for less-developed countries to know exactly what
their contribution to the negotiations should be."208 The United
States made clear, however, that "participating less-developed
countries should all make a contribution to the negotiations" and that
"it would be difficult for [the U.S.] delegation to make full use of the
authority which it possessed if less-developed countries did not make
some contribution to the negotiations as a whole."20 9 In a similar
vein, the EC representative clarified that the "notion of 'reciprocity'
contained two elements," namely "a contribution as such" and "the
quantitative value of such contribution"; it "seem[ed] obvious," the EC
representative explained, that the principle of nonreciprocity
"relate[d] more specifically to the value aspect," leaving "the
contribution aspect to be dealt with."
'210
In practical terms, "participation" in the Kennedy Round largely
revolved around the question to what extent a country would be
involved in the process of "justification . . . confrontation[,] and
negotiation" of the exceptions to the linear tariff reduction formula
that most of the developed countries had agreed to apply.2 11 To a
large extent, whether a country would benefit from the Kennedy
Round tariff reduction exercise depended on its ability to ensure that
the major developed countries did not exempt products of interest to
it from the linear cut. In order to do this, a country had to (a) know
whether products of interest to it had been exempted by any of the
linear countries and (b) be present in the meetings in which the
exceptions lists were examined and discussed. It was participation in
this basic sense-being allowed to see the exceptions lists, to be in the
room when they are discussed, and to participate in the discussion-
that the developed countries made contingent on the readiness of a
less developed country to "contribute" to the negotiations.
The Executive Secretary, even though he cared deeply about the
less developed countries' "contribution," was not willing to go quite as
far. He acknowledged that "there was no logical connexion between
the receipt of exceptions lists by the developing countries and
indication by these countries of their own contributions, since the
question of reciprocity did not arise."2 12 He merely suggested that
"for practical purposes, it was probably desirable . . . to establish
207. Id. at 14, 151.
208. Id. at 14, 1 52.
209. Id. at 16, 59.
210. Id. at 15, 58.
211. See Trade Negotiations Committee, Conclusions Reached by the Sub-
Committee on the Tariff Negotiating Plan at Its Meeting of 11 and 12 June 1964, GATT
Doc. TN.64/29, at 2, 2(c) (June 22, 1964) (setting out "procedures for the justification
and subsequent negotiation of exceptions").
212. TN.64JLDC/27, supra note 201, 2, 4.
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dates for the two distinct processes simultaneously."2 13 However, this
did not sit well with some developed countries. They noted that,
under the plan proposed by the GATT Secretariat, "the less-developed
countries would see the whole of the exceptions lists and enter into
discussion on their contents before they had provided any indication
of the extent of their own contribution to the Kennedy Round.,214 The
developed countries considered this to be at odds with the fact that,
with respect to the process of confrontation and justification, they had
only agreed to the involvement of
those developing countries which were participating. It would be difficult to
infer that developing countries were in fact full participants before the extent of
their contribution was known. It would therefore be preferable . . . for the
developing countries to submit an indication of their contribution prior to their
viewing the exceptions lists.
2 1 5
It is appropriate to take a step back at this point to appreciate
the particular meaning given to the term "participation" in this
statement. Recall that in the preparatory negotiations, it had
appeared that the developing countries had managed to overcome the
association between reciprocity and participation; in particular, they
achieved that their "participation"-involvement, membership, and
presence-in the Trade Negotiations Committee was not made
contingent on reciprocity. Instead of reintroducing conditions for
"participation" at the TNC-level, this statement redefines what
"participation" means. In effect, this statement indicated to the
developing countries the following: You may well be members of the
Trade Negotiations Committee. You may well be present at its
meetings. You may also be involved in its discussions. But none of
this means that you are participating in the trade negotiations.
Membership, presence, and voice (elements that would seem highly
indicative of what one would normally understand as political
participation) do not count; what counts is whether you pay. This is a
market, and you only participate-are a part of a market-if you buy
and sell.
Some developing countries were not fooled by the word play,
noting that the "procedural suggestions which had been made
appeared to represent a reversion to the concept of reciprocity."
2 16
Nevertheless, it was on the basis of this understanding of what
counts as "participation" that the process for the examination and
justification of exceptions from tariff reductions was organized. At the
center of this structure was an informal body composed of the "linear"
countries (i.e., those developed countries undertaking tariff
213. Id.
214. Id. at 3, 9.
215. Id. (emphases added).
216. Id. at 4, 12.
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reductions on the basis of a linear formula). This body met in January
and February of 1965 "to conduct the justification process."
' 2 17
Countries that had not submitted a linear offer were, with the
exception of Canada, not entitled to attend these meetings. According
to the "Plan for the participation of the less-developed countries in
the trade negotiations," the linear countries would subsequently
inform the participating less-developed countries (i.e., those that had
"formally notifi[ed] . . . their readiness to table" at a specific date "a
statement of the offers which they would make as a contribution to
the objectives of the trade negotiations") which items of special
interest to the less developed countries were contained on the
exceptions lists.2 18 On the same date, the developed countries would
also make "suggestions as to the offers which participating less-
developed countries might make."2 19 As the next step, the less
developed countries that had indicated their intention to make offers
were allowed to participate in an "examination of the lists of excepted
items" that were of interest to them.2 20 Finally, "[]ess-developed
countries having tabled a statement of their proposed contributions
would thereafter take part in the trade negotiations and would
receive the full exceptions lists." 221 While the submission of a
statement of offers thus in principle entitled a less developed country
to negotiate with the linear countries about the products on the
latter's exceptions lists, the United States had obtained a guarantee
that it was left "open to a developed country to decide whether a
217. Trade Negotiations Committee, Proceedings of the Tenth Meeting. Held at
the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 18 March 1965, GATT Doc. TN.64/SR.10, at 2, 5
(Apr. 14, 1965) [hereinafter TN.64/SR.10]. The decision to conduct the "process of
justification" in a "body consisting of the countries participating in the negotiations on
the basis of the linear offer" is recorded in TN.64/29, supra note 211, at 2, 2(c).
218. Trade Negotiations Committee, Report by Chairman on Meeting of the
Sub-Committee on the Participation of the Less-Developed Countries on 12 March
1965, GATT Doc. TN.64/41Rev.1, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1965) [hereinafter TN.64!41[Rev.1].
The Director-General described this process as follows: "[A]s the procedures relating to
the non-linear countries came into effect, the negotiation would not be limited to the
linear countries, but would gradually extend to cover all the participating countries."
TN.64/SR. 10, supra note 217, at 3, 7 (emphasis added).
219. TN.64/41/Rev.1, supra note 218, at 2, 3. Pursuant to this paragraph, the
United States presented individual "suggestion papers" to less-developed countries
and held at least forty-five meetings with LDC delegations "to explain [its] offers and
suggestions." Canada, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had also suggested "at
least some KR contributions by the LDC's [sic]." Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1964-1968, VOLUME VIII, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND TRADE POLICY, at
797 [hereinafter FRUS 1964-1968].
220. TN.64/41/Rev.1, supra note 218, at 2, 2(c). The Director-General would
later report that "a number of items of particular interest to less-developed countries
have been excepted from the linear cut." FRUS 1964-1968, supra note 219, at 785.
221. TN.64141/Rev.1, supra note 218, at 2, 4.
2016] THE CLUB APPROACH TO MULTILATERAL TRADE LAWMAKING 159
specific offer by a less-developed country constituted an acceptable
basis for opening negotiations with that country."
2 22
The disciplining effect of the definition of "participation"
established by the developed countries in the Kennedy Round is
evident in a document circulated by the GATT's Director-General,
formerly the Executive Secretary, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee "for the convenience of the Committee" in December
1965.223 The document contains two simple lists of countries. The
first records countries that had tabled offers on industrial or
agricultural goods or, in the case of less developed countries, had
submitted "statements of the offers they would make as a
contribution to the trade negotiations."22 4 The second lists countries
that had "formally notified their intention to participate in the trade
negotiations" but had "not yet presented" their statements of
offers.225 With respect to the first group of countries, the document
states that these countries had "been recognized as full participants
in the negotiations."226 Countries in the second group, by contrast,
"are to be regarded as full participants from the date on which they
present" their statements of offers. 227 This document represents
perhaps the prime example of "hierarchical observation" of
compliance with the reciprocity norm in multilateral trade
lawmaking.
228
While the group of "linear" countries was at the core of the tariff
negotiations, much of the "action" in the Kennedy Round occurred
among an even more select circle of participants referred to as the
"Bridge Club, '229 a group consisting of the Executive Secretary and
222. TN.64/SR.10, supra note 217, at 9, 32. This U.S. concern is reflected in
the proviso of the plan that "each participant will have the right to decide whether a
basis for negotiation exists." TN.64/41fRev.1, supra note 218, at 2, 6.
223. Trade Negotiations Committee, Status of Offers: Note by the Director-
General, GATT Doc. TN.64/73, at 1 (Dec. 16, 1965) [hereinafter TN.64.73].
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2, 3.
226. It appears that this recognition was not automatic, since the sentence
continues "with the exception of Turkey." Id. at 2. It is further explained that 'Turkey
has notified the Trade Negotiations Committee of the basis on which it proposes to
participate in the negotiations. The Committee has still to examine this proposal." Id.;
see also Trade Negotiations Committee, Participation in the Kennedy Round.
Notification by Turkey, GAIT Doc. TN.64/65, at 1 (June 1, 1965) [hereinafter TN.64/65]
(setting out the terms on which Turkey planned to participate in the Kennedy Round).
227. TN.64/73, supra note 223, at 2, 3.
228. See Morgan Brigg, Post-Development, Foucault and the Colonisation
Metaphor, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 421, 429-430 (2002) (interpreting Foucault's Discipline
and Punish, "Hierarchical observation and normalising judgement come together in the
examination... [i]t is here that 'truth' is established.").
229. See Winham, supra note 95, at 811 (noting that the Bridge Club
"effectively accounted for most of the actions of the round"); WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND,
supra note 23, at 272 ("[E]ssentially all of the action of the negotiation occurred within
this group.").
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representatives of the United States, the European Economic
Community (EEC), the United Kingdom, as well as, occasionally,
Japan and Canada.230 According to Curzon and Curzon, the "private
meetings" between the Bridge Club members represented the "control
center" of the Round.23 1 For example, when the Director-General
drafted a report on the progress of the Kennedy Round for the
attention of ministers of the participating countries,2 32 he "held a
series of information meetings with the major Kennedy Round
participants . . . before writing the report;" then, he gave the United
States, the EEC, Japan, and the United Kingdom an opportunity "to
comment individually on the first draft" and incorporated some of
their "suggested amendments ... in the final version."
2 33
What was true for the Kennedy Round-that the "main action of
the negotiation often occurred away from the multilateral
chambers"2 34-was even more characteristic of the next round of
trade negotiations, the Tokyo Round. Most negotiations in the Tokyo
Round had what Gilbert Winham, arguably the foremost historian of
the Tokyo Round, has described as a "pyramidal" structure, whereby
"agreements were initiated by the major powers at the top and then
gradually multilateralized through the inclusion of other parties in
the discussions."2 35 As Winham has explained,
Together, the EC and the United States conducted a largely bipolar
negotiation, with each 'superpower' effectively possessing a veto over the
various Tokyo Round agreements. Other parties such as Japan, Canada, and
smaller developed countries played important role in selected areas, but more
often than not faced a fait accompli when the two major players reached
bilateral agreement.
23 6
230. Winham, supra note 95, at 811; see also WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra
note 23, at 65, n.9 ("The small group in the Kennedy Round that included the United
States, the EEC, the United Kingdom, and variously Canada and Japan became known
as the 'bridge club."'); Curzon & Curzon, supra note 4, at 319 (explaining that the
'bridge club' was named for the fact that usually no more than four people were present
in the discussions).
231. Curzon & Curzon, supra note 4, at 319; see also ERNEST H. PREEG,
TRADERS AND DIPLOMATS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS
UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 186 (1970) (describing the
"informal but fairly frequent 'big four' meetings (the United States, the EEC, the
United Kingdom, and Japan) held by Wyndham White to assess the course of the
negotiations.").
232. FRUS 1964-1968, supra note 219, at 785.
233. Id. at 795.
234. WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23, at 65. Kahler calls this
phenomenon "disguised minilateralism." Kahler, supra note 33, at 686. For Kahler's
discussion of the Kennedy Round, see id. at 688.
235. WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23, at 376; see also id. at 174-75
(describing the pyramidal structure of the negotiation of the Tokyo Round Subsidies
Code).
236. Winham, supra note 95, at 811-12.
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Formal bodies, such as the Trade Negotiations Committee, played
even less of a role in the Tokyo Round negotiations than they had in
the Kennedy Round.
237
The extent to which the negotiations had this pyramidal
structure varied across the different negotiating areas and the
different phases of the negotiations. In the "Tariffs Group," for
example, the participants extensively debated the merits and
demerits of alternative tariff formulas, only to have the EC and the
United States proceed to agree bilaterally on a formula that was "not
even put before Group Tariffs for discussion or approval.'238 In the
subsidies negotiations, the basic outline of an agreement was
circulated in July 1978 by Canada, the EC, Japan, the Nordic
countries, and the United States "for the information and
consideration of other interested delegations."2 39 The limited circle of
participants in the subsequent negotiations was partly due to self-
selection. As Hufbauer et al. report,
only the United States, the EC, Japan and Canada took an active part in the
early stages of the subsidies negotiation. Only with great effort were countries
such as Mexico, India and Hungary involved in the negotiations. In fact, some
countries-such as Singapore and Australia, which watched the negotiations
closely-did not in the end associate themselves with the negotiated
Agreement.
24 0
The negotiations on customs valuation similarly followed the
pyramidal pattern.24 1 Sherman attributes the developing countries'
decision to propose an alternative code at the conclusion of the
negotiations to "the fact that the LDCs [less-developed countries], as
well as some other trading nations, were not consulted until
relatively late in the MTN proceedings, after the Code was nearing its
final form."242 Indeed, at the TNC meeting held to conclude the
round, the developing countries characterized the customs valuation
237. See D.M. McRae & J.C. Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty
Making: The Tokyo Round, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 68-71 (1983).
238. Id. at 64; see also id. at 68 (describing how the United States and the EC
reached agreement on a tariff reduction formula outside the multilateral negotiation)
and 71 (describing the crucial role of bilateral meetings between the United States and
the EC in the negotiations). [F]or the EC-US agreement on a tariff formula, see also
WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 2323, at 166-67.
239. Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Group "Non-Tariff Measures," Sub-
Group "Subsidies and Countervailing Duties," Subsidies/Countervailing Measures:
Outline of an Arrangement, GATT Doc. MTN[NTMIW/168, at 1 (July 10, 1978).
240. Hufbauer, Erb & Starr, supra note 116, at 67 n.41; see Proceedings of the
Session, supra note 170, at 76 (recording India's views on its participation in the
negotiations of the Subsidies Code).
241. WINHAM, TOKYO ROUND, supra note 23, at 188.
242. Saul L. Sherman, Reflections on the New Customs Valuation Code, 12 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 119, 129 (1980); see Customs Valuation, GATT Doc.
MTN/NTM/W/222/Rev. 1 (Mar. 27, 1979) (detailing the alternative code).
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code as a "draft negotiated among a certain number of developed
countries."2 43 And while the pyramidal dynamic was reportedly not
present in the negotiation of the Government Procurement Code,2 44 it
was taken to an extreme in the negotiations on the revision of the
Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code and the Code on Civil Aircraft.
Most participants in the Tokyo Round negotiations saw the texts of
these codes for the first time at the TNC meeting that was called to
draw up the Proc6s-Verbale to conclude the round. As Malaysia
protested at the meeting,
developing country delegations . . . have constantly pointed out the need for
transparency in the negotiations. Yet today we find texts of Agreements which
have been negotiated amongst a few developed countries on subjects like Trade
in Civil Aircraft of which an overwhelming majority of participants in the MTN
were not aware until 7 April 1979. My country and many other developing
countries are sizeable customers for civil aircraft and yet we have been kept out
of the negotiations of this Agreement. . . . The so-called Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of GATT is another document that has surfaced at
the final hour.
2 45
Malaysia was particularly frustrated by the fact that the developed
countries had resisted the creation of a formal negotiating subgroup
on anti-dumping, only to come up with a draft Anti-Dumping Code-a
revised version of the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code that had
243. Proceedings of the Session, supra note 170, at 40 (recording Brazil's
position).
244. WINHAM, ToKyo ROUND, supra note 23, at 189 (describing the negotiations
on government procurement as "fully engag[ing] all countries"); id. at 193-94
(describing the same negotiations as marked by an "absence of a pyramidal process").
245. Proceedings of the Session, supra note 170, at 62. Brazil highlighted that
"two of the texts before us-those dealing with civil aircraft and anti-dumping-are
new to my Delegation." Id. at 39. Switzerland noted that it had insufficient time to
study the civil aircraft code that had been "put before us by a few delegations." Id. at
64. Zaire's position was that "the results presented to us today constitute, in the case of
many of the codes, compromise solutions reached rather between developed partners
than between developed and developing partners." Id. at 70. Nigeria stated: "Many
developing countries' delegates were not consulted in some areas until the last days of
negotiations when amendments were impossible." Id. at 90. India noted "we have
neither participated in the negotiations nor had occasion to examine the texts which we
have seen only now." Id. at 73. The Indian delegate therefore expressed his delegation's
"total reservation with regard to the agreements reached among some delegations from
developed countries in respect of Anti-Dumping and Civil Aircraft." Id. The EC
delegation contested the validity of this criticism, id. at 48, stating that:
[I]f anyone says that they have been excluded from the negotiation
of this Agreement not only is that point not valid but we gave notice
of our intent some time back in July of last year, for example in the
Framework of Understanding of July 1978 of our intention to
negotiate an agreement in this area.
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been negotiated exclusively among developed countries2 4 6-at the
conclusion of the Round.
247
The discontent among the developing countries at that final TNC
meeting of the Tokyo Round was palpable. Malaysia dismissed the
draft codes before the Trade Negotiations Committee as "a series of
documents purporting to be Agreements."248 The Chilean delegate
remarked that his country was "placed before a minimum
compromise between the major trading nations."2 49 The developing
countries attributed the unsatisfactory way in which the negotiations
had proceeded to the lack of rules of procedure.250 Yugoslavia noted
the "fact that at some stages of the negotiations the developing
countries were not invited, and that transparencies were often
absent."
251
In sum, exclusionary negotiating arrangements, in conjunction
with a readiness to conclude agreements on a critical mass basis,
allowed the developed countries, in particular the United States and
the EC, to implement the club approach to trade lawmaking in the
Tokyo Round. Negotiating mostly among themselves, and enlarging
the circle of participants gradually by first including those most likely
to assent to their approach and marginalizing those most likely to
oppose it, the United States and the EC made it easier to come to an
agreement in the negotiations and managed to shape the results of
the negotiations decisively. They thus accomplished the first two
benefits associated with the club approach.
However, the Tokyo Round also showed the limits of the club
approach to multilateral trade lawmaking. In the area of safeguards,
which was largely a North-South issue, the developing countries
would have had to be part of any agreement for it to be meaningful.
The club approach did not "work" in this context, and the participants
failed to reach an agreement on safeguards in the Tokyo Round.
Moreover, as noted above, the MFN principle limited the extent to
which the developed countries could deny the benefits of the codes to
nonsignatories, thus curtailing their ability to entice the latter to join
those agreements on the signatories' terms.
2 52
Exclusionary negotiating arrangements were also characteristic
of the next negotiating round, the Uruguay Round, especially in its
final stages. "Green Room" meetings had been introduced by the
246. See id. at 47 (recording the EC's assessment of the proposed code as "a
satisfactory updating of the first Code in the GATT').
247. Id. at 62.
248. Id. at 61.
249. Id. at 87.
250. Malaysia recalled that the developing countries had "called for proper
rules of procedure to be laid out both for the Trade Negotiations Committee and for the
various Groups and Sub-Groups but the matter was not taken up." Id. at 62.
251. Id. at 36.
252. See supra notes 176-18 and accompanying text.
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GATT's new Director-General Arthur Dunkel in the early 1980s.
2 53
During the early stages of the Uruguay Round, Dunkel used the
Green Room to "organize negotiations, appoint chairs for each of the
groups, review proposals, maintain momentum, and make sure no
significant delegation was left out." 254 Which delegations were
invited to Green Room meetings depended partly on a country's
significance in trade terms and partly on the strength of individual
representatives; India and Brazil, for example, were always there.
2 55
As the Uruguay Round progressed, much of the action shifted
from the Green Room to bilateral negotiations between the United
States and the EC, sometimes with involvement of the other two
"Quad" countries-Japan and Canada. As Hugo Paemen and
Alexandra Bensch, two EC negotiators, have put it, even the
influence of coalitions such as the Cairns Group "gradually faded
away. As the battle over agriculture between the European
Community and the U.S. gathered pace, it became clear that there
was no room for additional combatants."
256
The agriculture negotiations, where the EC and the United
States had managed to reach a bilateral agreement that left the other
participants in the round little choice but to accept it as a fait
accompli, subsequently became the model on which the EC and the
United States hoped to resolve other outstanding issues in the
Round.25 7 Paemen and Bensch describe this "trigger strategy," which,
as they note, "had proved so effective in agriculture," as follows: "A
bilateral Euro-American solution would be found to the problems...
and endorsed by the two major partners, Japan and Canada.
Thereafter, it could be 'multilateralised' in Geneva."
25 8
253. FEN OLSER HAMPSON & MICHAEL HART, MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS:
LESSONS FROM ARMS CONTROL, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 204 (1995); see also
Richard Blackhurst & David Hartridge, Improving the Capacity of WTO Institutions to
Fulfill Their Mandate, in REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LEGITIMACY,
EFFICIENCY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 455, 464 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed.,
2005). The New York Times reported from the 1982 Ministerial Meeting: "[I]n a suite of
offices with olive green walls, members of the high-powered "chairman's group" held
24-hour vigils and were dubbed the 'boys in the green room."' Clyde H. Farnsworth, A
Reporter's Notebook: Behind the Scenes at the GATT Trade Talks in Geneva, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1982, at F8.
254. HAMPSON & HART, supra note 253, at 216.
255. Gabrielle Marceau, Interview with Warren Lavorel, VIMEO, http://
vimeo.com131135731, 10:40-12:08 (last visit Sept. 30, 2015) [http://perma.cc/6MDB-
VWGQ] (archived Sept. 30, 2015). See also Blackhurst & Hartridge, supra note 253, at
463, who note that the selection of Green Room participants was "apparently arbitrary"
but "well understood in fact."
256. PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 99.
257. "The USTR agreed to Leon Brittan's suggestion that intensive bilateral
talks be resumed to try to find in advance Blair House-style Euro-American solutions
to the major outstanding problems in the Uruguay Round context." Id. at 224.
258. Id. at 225.
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Unsurprisingly, this strategy led to some discontent particularly
among the developing countries. Paemen and Bensch report that,
after the major industrialized countries reached an agreement on key
elements of the Uruguay Round package at a G-7 summit in Tokyo,
the developing countries were quick to point out that the package contained
nothing at all for them. Whilst this may have been an exaggeration, it gave
some indication of the genuine frustration felt by the other participants in the
Uruguay Round. They had had to sit on the sidelines and watch while the
United States and the European Community decided their fate.
25 9
In the final stages of the Uruguay Round, the United States and the
EC thus exploited the first two benefits of the club approach to the
fullest extent: they negotiated mostly among themselves, which made
agreement easier, and they shaped the content of the resulting
agreement decisively. However, exclusive negotiating arrangement
did little for the third element of the club approach: the ability to
entice outsiders to join the agreement on the insiders' terms. The
solution that the developed countries eventually devised to deal with
this problem is the subject of the next subpart.
C. The Self- Transcending Club: The Single Undertaking and the
Founding of the WTO
In the previous subpart, I have discussed four practices of
participation that shaped lawmaking in the multilateral trading
system throughout the GATT era: (1) the negotiation of tariff
concessions with principal suppliers, (2) the exclusion of certain
product categories and types of trade barriers from negotiations, (3)
the conclusion of agreements among a "critical mass" of countries,
and (4) the use of informal and often exclusionary negotiating
arrangements. These practices allowed the major developed countries
to realize the first two benefits of the club approach-the relative
ease of reaching agreement among fewer participants, and the
disproportionate influence of those participants on the content of the
agreement-throughout the history of lawmaking in the GATT. By
the end of the Tokyo Round, it had become clear, however, that the
developed countries' ability to realize the third benefit of the club
approach-forcing outsiders to join the insiders on the insiders'
terms-was increasingly limited. Towards the end of the next round
of trade negotiations, the Uruguay Round, the United States
conceived of, and the other Quad countries embraced, a radical
solution to this problem. Under the scenario envisaged by the United
States and ultimately put into practice, the major trading nations
would leave the GATT and all the agreements concluded under its
259. Id. at 231.
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auspices, only to join a new regime comprising a substantively
identical, but legally distinct GATT as well as a number of new
agreements negotiated in the course of the Uruguay Round. The
central feature of the new regime, which would distinguish it from
the GATT framework, would be that any country that wanted to join
it had to subscribe to all the agreements concluded in the Uruguay
Round. The primary purpose of the new regime, which was originally
called the "GATT II" and ultimately became the World Trade
Organization, was thus to realize the third element of the club
approach: to compel countries that had been refusing to join the new
agreements in the Tokyo Round and that were planning to do
likewise in the Uruguay Round to join those agreements.
When the Uruguay Round negotiations were eventually
launched, they unfolded from the outset in a more polarized
atmosphere, especially between developed and developing countries,
than had ever before been the case. In the Kennedy Round, the
negotiations on nontariff barriers had been an uncontroversial, if
relatively unproductive affair.260 In the Tokyo Round, there was a
broad consensus to negotiate on nontariff measures such as
standards, subsidies and countervailing duties, and customs
valuation; disagreement centered on the substance of any new
disciplines and on the opaque and exclusionary manner in which
some of the negotiations proceeded.26 1 In the Uruguay Round, by
contrast, there was from the outset a fundamental disagreement
about whether negotiations on services, intellectual property rights,
and investment measures should take place in the GATT framework
at all.2 62 This was an entirely new level of discord, and it resulted in,
260. Only two agreements on non-tariff barriers were concluded in the Kennedy
Round: the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 128, and the ASP
Agreement, supra note 133.
261. See infra notes 235-250 and accompanying text for discussion on
disagreements in the Tokyo Round.
262. India and Brazil proposed the following amendment to the draft
ministerial declaration:
IV. Subiects for Negotiations Services
Delete the title and its content.
Communication from India and Brazil, GATT Doc. MIN(86)IW/111 (Sept. 9, 1986). See
also India's statement at the Punta del Este Ministerial:
We are firmly of the view that the issues of investment, intellectual
property and services do not belong to GATT .... The proposal to
hold negotiations on services in GATT
is ... untenable .... Continued adherence to the multilateral
trading system or commencement of the New Round cannot be
made contingent upon induction of alien themes into GATT.
India: Statement by Mr. Vishwanath Pratap Singh, Finance Minister, at the Meeting of
the GATT Contracting Parties at Ministerial Level, 15-19 September 1986, Punta del
Este, Uruguay, GATT Doc. MIN(86)/ST/33, at 3-4 (Sept. 17, 1986). See further the
proposal by India and Brazil for a decision to be adopted at the Punta del Este
Ministerial inviting governments "to give consideration to holding an
intergovernmental meeting to examine, outside the GATT framework, what
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by GATT standards, brutal confrontations and tortured compromises
throughout the round. 263 The compromises on services and
intellectual property rights were reached by holding out the prospect
that these issues would be kept institutionally separate from the
GATT-precisely the opposite of what ultimately happened.
The compromise on trade in services is embodied in the Punta
del Este Ministerial Declaration launching the Uruguay Round.
Apart from the introductory paragraph providing for the
establishment of a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and a
concluding paragraph explicitly keeping open the question of the
implementation of the negotiating results, the declaration is divided
into two parts.264 The first part is devoted to "Negotiations on Trade
in Goods," and the second part deals with "Negotiations on Trade in
Services." The separation of the negotiations on trade in goods and
trade in services was adopted to reassure the developing countries
that there would be no substantive linkage between the two sets of
negotiations.26 5 As Brazil reminded the other delegations at the first
meeting of the Group of Negotiations on Services, "the premise of
trade-offs between the area of goods and that of services has been
appropriate multilateral action is desirable on trade in services." Communication from
India and Brazil, GATT Doc. MIN(86)IW/3 (Sept. 19, 1986). On the divisions between
developed and developing countries at the outset of the Uruguay Round, see also
Steinberg, Consensus Decision-Making, supra note 176, and Winham, supra note 95, at
797-98.
263. An early climax was the decision by the United States to call for a formal
vote in order to break the developing countries' resistance to new negotiations. See
HAMPSON & HART, supra note 253, at 202 ("It took from 1979 to the middle of 1985 to
reach sufficient consensus among the GATT's core members that a new round would be
desirable, and even then it took rare resort to a formal ballot to isolate the dissidents")
and 207 (discussing the use of voting at the initiative of the United States to convene a
special session of the contracting parties and to establish the preparatory committee
for the launch of the Uruguay Round); OXLEY, note 23, at 132-35 (discussing the run-
up to the launch of the Uruguay Round, including the use of a postal ballot to convene
the special session). Moreover, the preparatory committee could not agree on a single
draft declaration and decided to forward three competing drafts to the ministerial
meeting; the Director-General's letter of transmittal, in which he appeared to express
a preference for one of the draft declarations, prompted a sharp rebuke from India and
Brazil. See Communication From the Chairman, GATT Doc. PREP.COM(86)W/50 (Aug.
8, 1986) (detailing the Director-General's position); Communication from India, GATT
Doc. L/6041 (Aug. 27, 1986) (complaining that the communication sent by the
Chairman "does not reflect adequately your own summing up at the end of the meeting
of the Preparatory Committee" and that "an element of value judgement has entered
into your communication"); Communication from Brazil, GATT Doc. L/6042 (Aug. 27,
1986) (highlighting the lack of consensus).
264. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. MIN.DEC
(Sept. 20, 1986) [hereinafter Punta del Este Declaration].
265. See OXLEY, supra note 23, at 138. Brazil went so far as to construct the
legal fiction that the negotiations on goods and the negotiations on services had been
launched at different meetings by different bodies and had established "two legally
distinct negotiating processes." Communication from Brazil, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/3, at 4-5 (Mar. 11, 987).
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excluded from the start of our deliberations."266 Moreover, the final
paragraph of the declaration made it clear that the integration of an
agreement on trade in services into the GATT was not to be seen as a
foregone conclusion; instead, the declaration envisaged that the
implementation of the negotiating results would be decided by the
contracting parties once the negotiations had been concluded.
267
The compromise on intellectual property rights started out
differently but ultimately assumed a similar form. Developing
countries were, if anything, even more resolutely opposed to the
inclusion of substantive obligations regarding the protection of
intellectual property rights into the GATT framework than they were
to the inclusion of services. 268 However, they could live with
negotiations to clarify and elaborate the existing GATT provisions
touching on intellectual property rights and to conclude an agreement
on trade in counterfeit goods that had already been the subject of
negotiations in the Tokyo Round. And this was all that they agreed to
in the Ministerial Declaration.
269
266. Communication from Brazil, GATT Doe. MTN.GNS/W/3, at 5 (Mar. 11,
987); see also id. at 43 ("What we would find particularly difficult to conceive, if not
impossible to accept, is the notion of cross-linkages between concessions in the area of
goods and in the area of services."); OXLEY, supra note 23, at 188-89 ("The major
concession that the developing countries secured at Punta del Este was that the
services negotiations would be formally delinked from the rest of the negotiations.");
PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 55 ("Since the two negotiations would be entirely
separate, there could be no question of advantages in the area of goods being offset by
concessions in the area of services, or vice-versa, trade-offs which would have been
both legitimate and inevitable had both areas been within the framework of the GATT.
The structure of the Uruguay Round prevented this.").
267. The concluding paragraph of the Punta del Este Declaration, supra note
264, at 10, reads:
Implementation of Results under Parts I and II
When the results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in all areas
have been established, Ministers meeting also on the occasion of a
Special Session of CONTRACTING PARTIES shall decide
regarding the international implementation of the respective
results.
268. See Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World:
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 691 (1989) (citing "consistent and intense developing country
resistance" to the incorporation of substantive intellectual property protections into the
trade regime).
269. For a discussion of how the draft ministerial declarations were amended to
reflect the developing countries' perspective, see CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN,
RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND & THE THIRD WORLD 126-30 (1990)
(comparing the Swiss-Colombian draft and the final version). See also PAEMEN &
BENSCH, supra note 23, at 119, stating:
In order to get the developing countries to accept the inclusion of
intellectual property in the Uruguay Round, the Ministerial
Declaration had explicitly limited the multilateral agreement to
counterfeit goods, a subject which had already been addressed
within the framework of the Tokyo Round ... As far as [the
developing countries] were concerned, the Uruguay Round TRIPs
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Once the negotiations were under way, however, the developed
countries essentially ignored the limited ministerial mandate and
proceeded to table negotiating texts envisaging substantive minimum
standards for the protection of intellectual property.2 70 Confident
that they had the ministerial mandate on their side, the developing
countries were "[n]ot willing to give an inch" and limited themselves
to pointing out that it was the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) that had "responsibility for all matters of
substance relating to rights."27 1 As a result,
for the first two years of negotiation, up to the Mid-Term Review Conference in
Montreal, the Northern hemisphere participants in the TRIPs negotiations
were talking about one thing, while those from the Southern hemisphere were
talking about something entirely different . . . . For the latter group, the
various documents churned out by the industrialised countries were not worth
the paper they were written on. They were utterly and totally irrelevant.
2 72
The Mid-Term Review in December 1988 did not advance matters.
The developed countries' position that substantive standards should
be included in the new agreement was reflected in the draft prepared
by the sympathetic chair.2 7 3 This met with fundamental opposition
from most developing countries, especially India. At the meeting,
the Indian negotiator reiterated time after time his total opposition to the
approach adopted by the text. His view was that a discussion of intellectual
negotiation did not go beyond adding one or two interpretative
notes to GATJT Articles IX (Marks of Origin) and XXd (General
Exceptions), which refer to intellectual property, and the adoption
of the text on counterfeit goods negotiated during the Tokyo Round.
270. PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 119. For an overview of the divergent
positions on the scope of the negotiations in the first two years of the Uruguay Round,
see generally GATTl1 Secretariat, Compilation of Written Submissions and Oral
Statements, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG1I/W/12/Rev. 1 (Feb. 5,1988).
271. PAEMEN & BENSCH, stpra note 23, at 119.
Some delegations said that much of what was suggested in the
United States paper and also in some of the other suggestions did
not fall in the mandate of the Group, which did not call for the
establishment of norms and standards for the protection of
intellectual property. It was not the job of the Group to establish a
new system for the protection of intellectual property rights in
GATT. These were matters for WIPO and were extensively under
consideration in the various parts of WIPO's current activities.
GATT Secretariat, Meeting of the Negotiating Group of 28 October 1987, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/4, at 11 (Nov. 17 1985). The developing countries relied on the
statement in the Ministerial Declaration acknowledging that the negotiations "shall be
without prejudice to other complementary initiatives that may be taken in the World
Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal with these matters." Punta
del Este Declaration, supra note 264, at 8.
272. Id. at 120.
273. Id. at 137.
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property, and especially the contents of rights, was out of place in the GATT
context. It was a matter for the World Intellectual Property Organisation.27 4
As a result, the document adopted at the meeting contains two
bracketed texts on intellectual property rights reflecting
diametrically opposed positions.275 Owing in part to the disagreement
on intellectual property rights, the Mid-Term Review was widely seen
as a failure and its results were put "on hold" until another high-level
meeting scheduled for April 1989.
At the April meeting, negotiators reached a compromise along
similar lines as the compromise on services reflected in the Punta del
Este Ministerial Declaration. According to Paemen and Bensch, EC
negotiators "secretly told India and Brazil that the future agreement
on TRIPs would not necessarily have to form part of the legal GATT
texts. This represented a major concession .... India, which tended
to adopt a legalistic attitude in matters relating to the GATT, allowed
itself to be persuaded.'276 This assurance is reflected in the following
proviso in the document adopted at the April 1989 meeting:
Ministers agree that the outcome of the negotiations is not prejudged and that
these negotiations are without prejudice to the views of participants concerning
the institutional aspects of the international implementation of the results of
the negotiations in this area, which is to be decided pursuant to the final
paragraph of the Punta del Este Declaration.2 7
7
With this proviso in place, the developing countries agreed to
negotiations encompassing substantive standards of intellectual
274. Id.; see also CHARAN DEVEREAUX, ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL D.
WATKINS, CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE NEGOTIATION: MAKING THE RULES 62 (2006) (At
the mid-term review, developing countries "continued to block any discussion of
substantive standards"). Somewhat disingenuously, Stewart states that Brazil and
India "prevented attainment" of the mid-term objectives. II THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 2268-69 (Terence P. Stewart ed.,
1993).
275. Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level: Montreal,
December 1988, at 21-24, GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/7(MIN) (Dec. 9, 1988).
276. PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 143. See also OXLEY, supra note 23,
at 170, stating:
Developing countries were still very unhappy about having to deal
with this subject. They were prepared to consider negotiations for
new commitments but would not yet concede that they should be
linked to the GATT system.
277. Trade Negotiations Committee Mid-Term Meeting, GATT Doc.
MTN.TNC/11, at 21 (Apr. 2, 1989). To recall, the final paragraph of the Punta del Este
Declaration, supra note 264, at 10, reads:
Implementation of Results under Parts I and II
When the results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in all areas
have been established, Ministers meeting also on the occasion of a
Special Session of CONTRACTING PARTIES shall decide
regarding the international implementation of the respective
results.
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property protection within the framework of the Uruguay Round. The
text held out the prospect that any results on substantive standards
could be either implemented under the auspices of WIPO or in
another manner that would keep it institutionally separate from the
GATT.2 78 At the same time, it allowed the developing countries to
finally engage in the negotiations on substantive standards. Up until
that point, these negotiations had been conducted almost exclusively
by the developed countries, and the developing countries recognized
the danger that they were losing the opportunity to influence the
final result in this area.
279
In sum, the compromise between developed and developing
countries that provided the basis for the negotiations on services and
intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round was that the
decision on the form and institutional framework of the
implementation of the negotiating results would be decided at the end
of the negotiations-presumably, as was GATT practice, on the basis
of consensus. Thus, the developing countries would be able to decide
to join these agreements only if they were implemented in a form that
was satisfactory to them, or not to join them at all. What the
developing countries wanted to avoid at all costs was that agreements
in these areas would be substantively linked to trade in goods, so that
failure to comply with commitments on trade in services and
intellectual property rights would give developed countries a right to
retaliate against the exports of developing countries (so-called cross-
retaliation).280 The "institutional reservation" on the implementation
278. It is clear that this remained India's position. An example of this is the
following statement from India:
The protection of intellectual property rights has no direct or
significant relationship to international trade. It is because
substantive issues of intellectual property rights are not germane to
international trade that GATT itself has played only a peripheral
role in this area and the international community has established
other specialised agencies to deal with them. It would therefore not
be appropriate to establish within the framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade any new rules and disciplines
pertaining to standards and principles concerning the availability,
scope and use of intellectual property rights.
Communication from India, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37, at 19-20 (July 10,
1989).
279. MOHAMED OMAR GAD, REPRESENTATIONAL FAIRNESS IN WTO RULE-
MAKING. NEGOTIATING, IMPLEMENTING, AND DISPUTING THE TRIPS PHARMACEUTICAL-
RELATED PROVISIONS 106 (2006).
280. "It is our belief that the developing countries in putting their signature to
linkages between goods and services will be putting their signature to crippling
economic retaliation which they can hope to ward off only by compromising their
national policies to the dictates of mightier economic powers. Are we to forge this
destiny for ourselves? Do we present these shackles when we go back home to our
countrymen?" India: Statement by Mr. Vishwanath Pratap Singh, Finance Minister, at
the Meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties at Ministerial Level, 15-19 September
1986, Punta del Este, Uruguay, GATT Doc. MIN(86)/ST/33, at 4 (Sept. 17, 1986).
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of the results in services and intellectual property rights appeared to
give them the right to reject any agreement that provided for cross-
retaliation. In short, it held out the promise than they could join any
agreement on their own terms.
This, of course, would frustrate the third element of the club
approach. It suggested that the developed countries could conclude
agreements on services and intellectual property rights among
themselves, but that they would not be able to compel countries like
India and Brazil-precisely those countries at whose practices these
agreements were primarily aimed-to join those agreements on the
developed countries' terms.
Faced with this scenario, U.S. negotiators began to internally
discuss options for concluding the Uruguay Round in late 1989.281
Preoccupied with the prospect that many developing countries would
"free ride" on the new agreements under negotiation in the round,282
U.S. negotiators considered the option of asking for a waiver from the
GATT MFN obligation for those agreements that presented the
greatest concern in this regard.2 83 They also contemplated different
scenarios under which nonsignatories would voluntarily renounce
their right to insist that the signatories apply an agreement on an
MFN basis, basically a formalization of what happened in the Tokyo
Round, at least with respect to the United States.
2 84
In the summer of 1990, U.S. negotiators began considering more
radical options to deal with the "free rider" problem.28 5 One of them
281. Interview with Richard Steinberg, Stanford, Cal. (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter
Steinberg Interview].
282. See PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 133, on the U.S. position in the
services negotiations:
The Americans were becoming obsessed with the idea of "free-
riding".... This was to be a constant concern throughout the
negotiations on services and took precedence over the Americans'
fear of alienating some of the developing countries.
283. Steinberg Interview, supra note 281.
284. As noted above, the United States had implemented the Tokyo Round
codes on Subsidies and Government Procurement on a conditional MFN basis; apart
from India (which was a signatory to the Subsidies Code, but against which the United
States invoked the non-application clause), no GATT contracting party ever formally
complained about this.
285. The following is primarily based on an interview with Richard Steinberg,
as well as interviews with Craig Thorn, Jane Bradley, Rufus Yerxa, and Andrew Stoler
(via email). Steinberg, who was working at USTR at the time, was chiefly responsible
for developing options for concluding the round. Thorn, Bradley, Yerxa, and Stoler were
involved in the internal discussions. By his own account, Steinberg's thinking on this
issue was influenced by the Realist school in International Relations, which posits that,
for international institutional arrangement to be sustainable, they must reflect the
power relations between the participants in such arrangements. Steinberg had studied
with Stephen Krasner, a proponent of the Realist school. Steinberg also recalls that the
early 1990s were the heyday of the so-called "Washington consensus." One of the tenets
of the "Washington consensus" was that developing countries should embrace trade
liberalization for their own sake. It thus appeared that forcing the developing countries
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was the "GATT II" approach, whereby the "Quad" countries-the
United States, the EC, Japan, and Canada-would withdraw from
the GATT and join a substantively identical but legally distinct
"GATT II" to which the new Uruguay Round agreements as well as
the amended Tokyo Round codes would be annexed.286 The idea was
that not joining the new GATT II and thus losing all rights to access
the markets of the Quad countries would prove too costly for virtually
all other contracting parties, thus forcing them to join the GATT II on
the Quad countries' terms. The chief drawback of the approach as it
was perceived at the time was that it would be too confrontational
and would further deteriorate relations with the developing countries.
U.S. negotiators referred to this option internally as "the power
play. 287
An alternative option that was contemplated was to add the new
agreements to the existing GATT through an amendment and to
subsequently expel those contracting parties that refused to ratify the
amendment from the GATT. 28 8 The major downside of this approach
was that it would be hard to secure the support of two-thirds of the
contracting parties to bring the amendment into force, and even
harder to convince a sufficient number of contracting parties to
subsequently expel those who did not ratify the amendment.28 9 Also,
this variant did not appear significantly less confrontational than the
"GATT II" approach.
Other ideas under discussion revolved around obtaining a waiver
from the GATT's MFN obligation either for all Uruguay Round
agreements as a package or for each agreement individually. What
was clear to U.S. negotiators even at this point was that an "A la
carte," or "menu," approach to concluding the Uruguay Round,
whereby each contracting party could choose which agreement to
accept and at the same time enjoy the benefits of all agreements on
an MFN basis, was unacceptable to them.2 90 Of course, this was
precisely the scenario on the basis of which the developing countries
to join the agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round would ultimately be in those
countries' own interest. Steinberg Interview, supra note 281.
286. Id.
287. Steinberg, supra note 168, at 360.
288. The possibility to expel a contracting party that refuses to adopt an
amendment was envisaged in GATT art. XXX:2, which provides, in relevant part:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide that any amendment
made effective under this Article is of such a nature that any
contracting party which has not accepted it within a period
specified by the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be free to
withdraw from this Agreement, or to remain a contracting party
with the consent of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
289. Steinberg Interview, supra note 281.
290. Id.
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had agreed to negotiate on services and substantive intellectual
property rights.
Meanwhile, the EC and Canada were pursuing a different idea,
namely, to set up a new institution as an organizational umbrella for
the GATT and the new Uruguay Round agreements. Canada, which
was drawing on the ideas of Professor John Jackson, 291 first
suggested the establishment of a "World Trade Organization" in April
1990,292 and the EC followed up with a formal proposal for a
"Multilateral Trade Organization" (MTO) to the negotiating group on
the "Functioning of the GATT System" (FOGS) in July 1990.293 As
the EC explained at the first meeting of the FOGS group at which the
question was discussed, it was not seeking to "undertake anything
particularly revolutionary." Instead, its aim was "to establish a
purely organizational treaty" that would provide an "umbrella-type
organizational framework" for the "implementation and
administration of the results of the negotiations and perhaps legally
separate multilateral agreements."2 94 The EC noted the possibility of
"a services agreement which in all likelihood would be separate from
the GATT. ' '2 95 The EC explicitly cited the WIPO as "an example of
the kind of common organizational umbrella for different
international agreements which his delegation was looking [sic] in
this regard.' 2 96 This, of course, ran directly counter the United
States' thinking at the time. Sure enough, the U.S. representative
took a dim view of the rationales offered by the EC for establishing a
new organization.29 7 In particular, the United States argued that
legal structure was not and would not be the cause of the 'fragmentation' of the
trading system. The fundamental problem was political; some countries refused
to accept new obligations or clarifications of old obligations. The mere creation
of an MTO could not force any country to accept an obligation which it was not
otherwise willing to accept, and it could not therefore solve this problem.
2 9 8
To the United States' surprise, the EC subsequently proved very
receptive to the "single protocol" approach, as U.S. negotiators had
291. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990) (setting
out Jackson's diagnosis of what ailed the trading system and his vision for how it
should be reformed) Jackson was hired as a consultant by the Canadians.
292. Winham, supra note 95, at 821, 821 n.23 (quoting a press release of April
11, 1990).
293. Communication from the European Community, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG14/W/42 (Jul. 9, 1990).
294. GATT Secretariat, Meeting of 25-26 June 1990, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG14/18, 9 51 (Jul. 9, 1990).
295. Id.
296. Id. 9 53.
297. Id. 30-35.
298. Id. $ 32.
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started calling the "GATT II" idea,299 when the United States first
presented the idea to the other Quad countries later in July 1990.300
In discussions with the Quad countries in the following months, the
United States pressed the point that adopting the "single protocol"
approach would not only take care of the problem of "free riders," but
would also limit the extent to which the Quad countries would have
to make substantive concessions to the other participants in the
Round, thus making it possible to avoid what U.S. negotiators called
"lowest common denominator" agreements. 301 In effect, U.S.
negotiators were arguing that the "single protocol" allowed the Quad
to go all in for the club approach to multilateral trade lawmaking: in
the United States scenario, all that ultimately mattered was that the
Quad countries reached agreement among themselves; all other
countries would effectively be forced to join whatever the Quad
agreed on the Quad's terms.
In order to make the "single protocol" idea more palatable to the
other Quad countries and, eventually, the rest of the contracting
parties, U.S. negotiators started linking it with the "single
undertaking" principle contained in the Punta del Este Ministerial
Declaration.30 2 The principle stipulated: "The launching, the conduct
and the implementation of the outcome of the negotiations shall be
treated as parts of a single undertaking."30 3 This was somewhat
disingenuous; it was clear to everyone involved that "[ilt was never
the intention at Punta Del Este to craft a process that would
automatically obligate all GATT [contracting parties] to be bound by
all of the agreements." 304 As Andrew Stoler, one of the U.S.
299. In discussions with the other Quad countries, U.S. negotiators sought to
highlight the unifying effect of their approach, in that it would provide an elegant way
of tying the results of the round together ("Single Protocol"), and to de-emphasize the
more dramatic aspect of their proposal: that it envisaged doing so through a successor
agreement o the GATT ("GATT II"). The latter aspect, they suggested, could be treated




303. Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 264, at B(ii). The Tokyo Declaration
had contained a similar principle, pursuant to which the negotiations were to be
"considered as one undertaking, the various elements of which shall move forward
together." World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 15 September 1973,
WTO Doc. GATT/1134, 12 ILM 1533 (1973), 8. Regarding the meaning of this
principle, U.S. negotiators commented that it would allow "the U.S. to keep the
agriculture issue as part of the negotiation and not to allow it to be separated and
possibly lost." FRUS 1973-1976, supra note 142, at 684. In the debate about the
implementation of the Tokyo Round results, the principle played no role. See generally
Robert Wolfe, The WTO Single Undertaking as Negotiating Technique and Constitutive
Metaphor, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 835 (2009) (discussing the origins and wider significance
of the "single undertaking" idea).
304. Andrew Stoler, Breaking the Impasse: A Critical Mass Approach to
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, CPP SYMP. ON THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL
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negotiators promoting the reinterpretation of the "single
undertaking" concept in 1990, would later write, "the single
undertaking as it was expressed in 1986 in no way was interpreted as
implying that all participants in the negotiations would need to take
on all of the resulting obligations-especially those resulting from the
services negotiations."
30 5
In the negotiations up until that point, the "single undertaking,"
or principle of "globality," as the Europeans liked to call it, had been
repeatedly invoked in attempts to adjust the pace of negotiations in
one area to the progress in another. In particular, the Europeans had
championed it to whittle down the ambitions in the agricultural
negotiations by linking them to other negotiating areas.30 6 When the
negotiations in agriculture stalled during the Mid-Term Review of the
Uruguay Round held in Montreal in 1988, the Latin Americans had
in turn relied on the principle to withhold their consensus to the
results in other areas.30 7 Essentially, then, U.S. negotiators were
attempting to change the meaning of the "single undertaking" from
the Tokyo Round/Punta del Este understanding as "the various
elements of [the negotiations] shall move forward together" to a
"single protocol" understanding as "accept everything or remain
outside the multilateral system."30 8 There is little doubt that "few
TRADE Sys., at 1, http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au/docs/critical-massspeech-final.pdf
fhttp://perma.cc/84DL-7U8Y] (archived Sept. 30, 2015).
305. Id. at 4.
306. See in particular, the discussion of the principle in PAEMEN & BENSCH,
supra note 23, at 58, 80-81 ("[T]he principle of globality had been introduced to avoid
excessive concentration on agriculture."), 97-98, 195 ("[Tlhe principle of globality, the
European Community's battle-cry throughout the Uruguay Round, was really a one-
way instrument, designed to adjust the pace of negotiations in other sectors to that of
agriculture"). See also OXLEY, supra note 23, at 158 ("The Americans interpreted
globality as 'Eurospeak' for saying that little was to be allowed to happen in the
negotiations on agriculture.").
307. See OXLEY, supra note 23, at 169 (describing how the Latin American
members of the Cairns Group blocked the outcome on other issues in the absence of
progress in the negotiations on agriculture); PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 80
("This 'principle of globality' would later be taken up by other participants and
exploited for their own ends."); Winham, supra note 95, at 808-809, 813 (describing the
Latin American countries' decision to withhold their consensus at the mid-term review
as "the most vivid example of the influence developing countries have had on the
Uruguay Round"); see also Rubens Ricupero, Integration of Developing Countries into
the Multilateral Trading System, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL 9, 16 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds., 1998)
("Developing countries were among the main proponents of the single undertaking
provision in paragraph B (ii) of the Punta del Este Declaration. The Latin American
members of the Cairns Group, in particular, wished to pre-empt a recurrence of the
situation in earlier multilateral rounds where the initiatives to liberalize the
agriculture sector had simply been permitted to die during the course of the
negotiations.") (emphasis in original); Gabrielle Marceau, Interview with Julio Lacarte-
Mur6, VIMEO, https://vimeo.com/31948117, 13:58-16:44 (last visit Nov. 15, 2015)
[perma.cc/R7LS-38T9] (archived Jan. 7, 2016).
308. Gallagher & Stoler, supra note 127, at 381 (quotes in "accept everything"
phrase in original); see also PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 257 ("[Ihe
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countries would have accepted this interpretation of the single
undertaking in 1986."3°9
As it happened, the developing countries were no more prepared
to accept the new meaning of the "single undertaking" in 1990. By
November 1990, the United States had held informal consultations on
the idea with some developing countries, including India and Brazil.
At a TNC meeting in December 1990, India made its position clear:
We have entered into negotiations in the area of TRIPs with a clear reservation
on the question of lodgement of the outcome. Nearly two years of negotiations
on norms and standards have convinced us that there is no place in GATT for
an agreement covering these aspects. They raise issues of policy spanning over
diverse areas of technology, ethics, culture and economic development. GAT is
concerned with trade policies and should remain as such.
Negotiations for a multilateral framework on services have always been held in
a separate juridical framework distinct from GATT ....
[V]e are concerned at attempts to link agreements in the area of TRIPs and
trade in services to the GATT through the concept of a single undertaking or
the mechanism of a common dispute settlement machinery. We are not opposed
to the idea of a new organization by whatever name it is called, as long as it is
structured to service three distinct agreements. We reject any proposal which
tends to link up three distinct agreements with a view to facilitating cross-
retaliation.
310
At a meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in March 1991, the Indian ambassador did
not mince his words, stating that
The concept of a "single undertaking" had been introduced at a "very late stage"
and was tantamount to "breach of good faith". [sic] It was not part of the basis
of negotiations and had been introduced to force Third World countries to
accept all the results of the Round or opt out of the system. It would be prudent
to avoid such an approach. The provision of flexibility for the Third World had
not only to be in terms of time derogation but in absolute terms so that they
industrialised countries have invented the principle of the 'Single Undertaking', which
states in effect that the results of the negotiations constitute a single entity-and that
a country must decide whether to take it or leave it."); Ricupero, supra note 307, at 16
("[Diuring the period between the Montreal and Brussels Ministerial meetings, the
concept of single undertaking was altered, mainly at the initiative of the EC and
Canada, but with ideas coming from the GATT Secretariat.") (emphasis in original);
note that Ricupero arguably misinterprets who was the driving force behind the
reinterpretation; Stoler, supra note 304, at 1, 4 ("[T]he Quad countries decided that
they could take advantage of the creation of the Multilateral Trade Organization (later
the WTO) to force other Uruguay Round participants to accept a different meaning of
the single undertaking language .... The Quad changed the meaning of the Uruguay
Round's single undertaking at the end of the game.").
309. Stoler, supra note 304, at 4.
310. World Trade Organization, Meeting at Ministerial Level, Brussels,
December 1990, India: Statement by Dr. Subramanian Swamy, Union Minister of
Commerce, Law and Justice, MTN.TNCMIN(90)/ST/46 (Dec. 4, 1990), at 4; Interview
with Richard Steinberg (explaining that Brazil took a similar position in informal
consultations).
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were not forced to accept obligations inconsistent with their development,
financial and trade needs.
3 11
The Draft Final Act that was sent to the Brussels Ministerial
Meeting in December 1990 still reflected the developing countries'
position. Thus, it envisaged that the participants in the negotiations
would
agree that the Agreements, Decisions and Understandings on trade in goods, as
set out in Annex I, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, as set out
in Annex II, [the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, as set out in Annex III{FN1}]
[and institutional provisions as set out in Annex I, [constitute [three] [four]
distinct legal texts] and embody the results of their negotiations.
3 1 2
The section on intellectual property rights made the continuing
disagreement between developed and developing countries explicit:
The presentation of two draft agreements, the first on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods and the
second on Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, is a reflection of two
basically different approaches to the question of the relationship of the
eventual results to the GATT. Some participants ... envisage a single TRIPS
agreement encompassing all the areas of negotiation; this agreement would be
implemented as an integral part of the General Agreement. Other
participants ... envisage two separate agreements, one on Trade in Counterfeit
and Pirated Goods, to be implemented in GATT, and the second on standards
and principles concerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual
property rights. The latter agreement would be implemented in the "relevant
international organization, account being taken of the multidisciplinary and
overall aspects of the issues involved." It was agreed in the Mid-Term Review
that the institutional aspects of the international implementation of the results
of the negotiations on TRIPS would be decided by Ministers pursuant to the
final paragraph of the Punta del Este Declaration.
3 1 3
At this time, the annex on institutional provisions was still largely a
blank page.
314
One year later, the GATT's Director-General, Arthur Dunkel,
presented another version of the draft final act, the so-called "Dunkel
Draft." The United States and EC had persuaded Dunkel to
311. C. Raghavan, G77 Assail "Single Undertaking" and MTO Efforts in Round,
SUNS ONLINE (Mar. 18, 1991), http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/process/during/
uruguay/mto/03180091.htm [http://perma.cc/M5ZH-YHAJ] (archived Sept. 30, 2015).
312. Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, WTO Doc.
MTN.TNCIW/35/Rev. 1 (1990), at 2 (square brackets in original) (referring in footnote 1
to the "institutional reservation" that had provided the basis for the Mid-Term Review
compromise on intellectual property rights).
313. Id. at 193.
314. Id. at 384 (containing a placeholder for an "organizational agreement").
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incorporate the "single protocol" idea into his draft.3 15 Article II of the
proposed Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization316 achieved all of the United States' objectives: It tied
the results of the Uruguay Round together by providing that the
agreements annexed to the MTO Agreement would constitute an
"integral part" of the MTO Agreement.3 17 It stipulated that the
agreements "shall have all members as parties," 318 thus eliminating
any possibilities for "free riding." And, it constituted the MTO
Agreement as a successor agreement to the GATT by providing that
"[t]he General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as it results from the
Final Act of the Uruguay Round . . . is legally distinct from the
Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
dated 30 October 1947."319 This would allow the Quad countries to
withdraw from the original GATT and to terminate the market access
obligations to GATT contracting parties that they had accumulated
over the four decades of GATT's operation with respect to any country
that refused to join the new organization. As a result, those who
refused to join "would remain contracting parties to a de facto defunct
agreement.
320
315. See Steinberg, supra note 168, at 356 ("[T]he Dunkel Draft ... was tabled
by the GATT Director-General as the secretariat's draft. However, it was largely a
collection of proposals prepared by and developed and negotiated between the EC and
the United States, fine-tuned after meeting with broader groups of countries, and it
embodied the secretariat's changes mostly on points of contention between the two
transatlantic powers.").
316. See Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, WTO Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA
(1991), at 91 [hereinafter Dunkel Draft] (explaining its establishment in the
Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization (Annex IV)).
317. Id. at 92 (art. II.1. of the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization).
318. Id.
319. Id. (art. 11.3. of the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization) (emphasis added).
320. Ricupero, supra note 307, at 17; see also Hudec, GATT, supra note 148, at
76 ("[Glovernments would have to decide between accepting everything or leaving the
GATT."); Klaus Stegemann, The Integration of Intellectual Property Rights into the
WTO System, 23 WORLD ECON. 1237, 1243 (2000) (explaining that not joining the new
organization would mean "giving up the cumulated market access rights as guaranteed
by multilateral trading rules and as negotiated in all GATT rounds."); Steinberg, supra
note 168, at 360 (explaining the single undertaking approach); Stoler, supra note 304,
at 4 ("In their decision to leave the old GATT and its MFN obligations behind, the
Quad countries were able to force Uruguay Round participants into accepting
obligations under all of the new system's agreements with the exception of the
Government Procurement and Civil Aircraft Codes."); Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden
Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping
Decisions, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 109, 170, 177 (2002) ("[S]uppose that the entire
Uruguay Round was in some sense a contract of adhesion imposed by the United States
(and possibly the European Union), leaving many developing countries with the
Hobson's choice of acceding to an unsatisfactory package of agreements or being left
out of the trading system altogether .... a smaller state may ... be faced with the
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The institutional provisions of the Draft Final Act were not
finalized for another two years. Negotiations occurred primarily in
the "Informal Group on Institutional Issues," chaired by Julio Lacarte
between September and December 1993.321 According to Andrew
Stoler, the U.S. representative in the Lacarte group who was, in his
own words, "very much involved in the Quad discussions that
eventually led to th[e] reinterpretation of the Punta 'single
undertaking' and [in] forcing this down the throats of developing
countries,"32 2 the latter "did not give in until the Lacarte group
successfully tied up all the ends"; thus, "the whole issue stayed alive
until mid-December 1993 when it fell into place on the last couple of
days of the negotiations."32 3 In the end, the "single protocol" idea, as
it was first incorporated in the Dunkel Draft, survived without
substantive changes into the final version of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.324 This was
unsurprising; once the Quad countries had agreed to go ahead with
the approach, there was simply nothing that the developing countries
could do to prevent it from happening. That was the entire point.
The WTO, then, came into being as the ultimate club. Once the
Quad countries knew that they would leave the old club and found a
new one, they also knew that all they had to do was to agree among
themselves. While this was not exactly easy-disagreements on
agriculture and services persisted until the very end-it was at least
possible. The founding of the WTO also gave the developed countries
the leverage to shape the results of the Uruguay Round decisively. A
multilateral agreement on services and an agreement on substantive
intellectual property rights were both linked to trade in goods
through the possibility of cross-retaliation in dispute settlement.
These were all points that the developing countries, and in particular
India, had opposed categorically throughout the round.
325
Even more so than the GATT, however, the WTO was supposed
to be a self-transcending club: it was never the intention to keep other
choice of either signing on to the new agreements anyway or risk being left behind by
the world trading system. This was quite literally true in the Uruguay Round, which
substituted the 'GATT 1994' for the original GATT and thus ended the obligations of
GATT members under the original agreement. Had a dissident state chosen not to
accept the whole package of agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round, it would
have been left with no multilateral trade rights.").
321. See PAEMEN & BENSCH, supra note 23, at 234; E-mail from Andrew Stoler
to Nicolas Lamp (Feb. 7, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Stoler
Correspondence] (describing the negotiations in the Lacarte Group).
322. Stoler Correspondence, supra note 321.
323. Id. at 1.
324. See Marrakesh Agreement art. 11.2, II.4.
325. While India noticeably warmed to the services agreement during the
course of the negotiations, there is not a single negotiating document from the Uruguay
Round in which India goes on record as supporting either cross-retaliation between
services, intellectual property, and goods, or a GATT agreement on substantive
intellectual property rights.
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countries out and to limit its membership. Rather, the intention was
to get everyone else to join, but on the insiders' terms. The Quad
countries' willingness to exit the GATT and to establish a new treaty
in its stead provided them with unprecedented leverage to build the
trading system they wanted. Perhaps ironically, the Quad countries
used this leverage to eliminate the "multi-tier" system326 that had
emerged through the club dynamics of the GATT era and replace it
with a "one-tier system"3 2 7 in which all countries had to assume
similar levels of obligation. In a way, then, the WTO was supposed to
be the club to end all clubs.
D. The Internalized Club: Lawmaking in the WTO
The conclusion of the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994 and the
establishment of the WTO changed the framework for multilateral
trade lawmaking in important ways. First, the establishment of the
WTO held the promise that lawmaking would occur on a continuous
basis, dispensing with the need for major negotiating rounds.3 28 The
built-in negotiating agendas in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Agriculture,329 as well as the
decisions taken at the Marrakesh Ministerial to continue negotiations
on unfinished business of the Uruguay Round, were concrete
commitments in this respect.330 Second, the Marrakesh Agreement
326. Curzon & Curzon, supra note 129, at 143-44.
327. Stoler Correspondence, supra note 321, at 2.
328. See Mike Moore, The Democratic Roots of the World Trade Organization, in
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYsIs,
VOLUME I 39, 5 n.5 (Patrick F.J. Macrory et al. eds., 2005); Debra P. Steger, The
Culture of the WTO: Why It Needs to Change, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 483, 492-93 (2007)
(noting that the Marrakesh Agreement "did not expressly contemplate major
negotiating rounds," and that agreements could be concluded without rounds).
329. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIX, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (planning to conduct periodic negotiations within five
years); Agreement on Agriculture art. 20, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1995) (planning to start negotiations one year before the end of
implementation).
330. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on Negotiations on
Movement of Natural Persons, https://www.wto.orglenglish/docs-e/legal-e/47-dsnat.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6LNA-J9PC] (archived Sept. 30, 2015) (establishing a negotiating
group); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on Financial Services,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/48-dsfin.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL98-488U]
(archived Sept. 29, 2015) (planning to monitor negotiations within four months of the
WTO agreement); Decision on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs-eflegal-e/49-dsmar.pdf [https://perma.cc/LAA9-
MAY9] (archived Sept. 30, 2015) (planning negotiations to take place between May 16,
1994, and June 1996); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on Negotiations
on Basic Telecommunications, https://www.wto.orgenglishdocs-elegal-e/50-dstel.pdf
[https:H/perma.cc/4454-WG2L] (archived Sept. 29, 2015) (deciding that negotiations
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arguably transformed the institutions of the multilateral trading
system from a forum for the conclusion of bilateral or plurilateral
"contracts" into a something more akin to a legislative body. Whereas
the GATT system had allowed subsets of contracting parties to agree
to more ambitious obligations in areas in which they had a particular
interest without the consent of the other contracting parties,33 1 the
WTO Agreement gives the entire membership control over the
conclusion of new plurilateral agreements.33 2 Moreover, by obliging
all Members to join all WTO agreements (with the exception of the
four plurilateral agreements, of which two are now defunct), the WTO
system gives all members a stake in the development of the law in all
areas, thus making them potentially more reluctant to let small
groups of members take the lead in developing the law among
themselves.33 3 As a result, it has become much more difficult for a
subset of members to assume more ambitious obligations in the
framework of the multilateral trading system. Finally-and this may
be the most consequential point-the very success of the Uruguay
Round single undertaking in forcing the developing countries to
assume an unprecedented level of obligations made it highly unlikely
that the developed countries would ever be willing and able to employ
the club approach in its most extreme form 334 again. On the one
would take place between May 16, 1994, and April 30, 1996); World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Decision on Professional Services https://www.wto.org/
englishltratope/serve/20-prof-e.htm [https://perma.cc/7KX2-BALQ] (archived Sept.
30, 2015); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on the Application and
Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, https://www.wto.org/english/docs-eflegal e/53-ddsu.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D4WC-CWHB] (archived Sept. 29, 2015) (planning to review the rules within four
years of the "the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization").
331. Recall the unsuccessful attempt by developing countries at the conclusion
of the Tokyo Round to make the opening for acceptance of the Tokyo Round codes
subject to a consensus decision of the TNC. See Trade Negotiations Committee,
Proceedings of the Session, supra text accompanying note 170.
332. See Marrakesh Agreement art. X.9 (The Ministerial Conference, upon the
request of the Members parties to a trade agreement, may decide exclusively by
consensus to add that agreement to Annex 4.") (emphasis added).
333. Andrew Stoler has highlighted this implication of the Uruguay Round
single undertaking as well: "By forcing all developing countries (and all of the countries
that had been in "de facto [contracting party]" status) to join the WTO and accept all
the agreements, we forced all of them to also be part of the future decision-making
process in the WTO." Stoler Correspondence, supra note 321, at 2 (emphasis in
original).
334. The club approach takes its most extreme form where the insiders attempt
to implement the third element of the approach (i.e., compelling outsiders to join the
club on the insiders' terms) by denying outsiders not only the benefits of any new
commitments assumed by the insiders (as in the case of the GPA), but also the benefits
of previously granted commitments. The only examples of this extreme form of the club
approach are the GATT/ITO Charter, which provided for the possibility that the
benefits of the ITO Charter could be denied to any ITO member who did not join the
GATT, and the WTO Agreement, which effectively allowed its Members to deny the
benefits of the GATT 1947 to any GATT member who did not join the WTO.
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hand, the multilateral trade regime has arguably become too valuable
to the developed countries for them to credibly threaten that they
would exit the WTO. This threat was credible in the GATT, which
imposed low levels of discipline on developing countries and was
marred by an ineffective dispute settlement system; it is not credible
in the WTO, which combines high levels of discipline on developing
countries with an effective dispute settlement mechanism.335 On the
other hand, the developing countries are determined not to find
themselves in a scenario in which the developed countries present
them with a fait accompli ever again, and they have been highly
effective in building blocking coalitions that will allow them to avoid
such an outcome in future negotiations.336 To some extent, then, the
establishment of the WTO has indeed ended all clubs.
337
Interestingly, both Richard Steinberg and Andrew Stoler,
probably the chief architects of the Uruguay Round "single
undertaking," are unhappy with this outcome.3 38 Stoler "regret[s] it
all deeply" and now finds "the whole idea" to have been "a huge
mistake."339 According to Stoler, it eventually turned out that "the
one-size-fits-all approach was not going to work and that the system
was never going to be a one-tier system."340 At the same time, the
single undertaking resulted in a large number of countries being
"deeply involved in decision-making and often making sure that
335. Richard Steinberg also argues that a "replay [of] the 1994 'power play' that
concluded the Uruguay Round" is now "impossible," albeit for different reasons. In
Steinberg's view, the threat of exit by the European Union and the United States
would not be credible because, as a result of the proliferation of preferential trade
agreements since the mid-1990s, "the US and EU each owe MFN to many countries
independent of the GATT Art. I obligation by virtue of their MFN obligations in their
free trade agreements. They would have to exit all trade agreements to replay the 1994
power play." Richard Steinberg, Future of the WTO, U. CHICAGO L. SCH. FACULTY BLOG
(Feb. 23, 2009), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/future-of-the-
wto.html [http://perma. cc/ZZD4-S586] (archived Sept. 30, 2015).
336. See infra note 354 and accompanying text, at 142-43 (explaining that
Brazil and India formed a developing-country alliance to push back against the U.S.
and E.U.'s plan that advanced their own agendas at the expense of other nations).
337. At least within the multilateral trading system. One could interpret the
proliferation of preferential trade agreements over the past two decades as a form of
exit by the major trading powers, that is, a decision to pursue trade liberalization
outside the multilateral trading system rather than within it. However, while there are
certainly club dynamics at play in the negotiation of preferential trade agreements,
they are not taking the extreme form that one encounters at key moments in the
evolution of the multilateral trading system: there is no indication that any subset of
WTO members would be prepared to leave the WTO in order to entice other countries
to join a preferential trade agreement. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
338. See Stoler Correspondence, supra note 321; Steinberg Interview, supra
note 281.
339. Stoler Correspondence, supra note 321, at 2.
340. In Stoler's view, "things have got much worse since [the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, N.L.] with a proliferation of groups getting special treatment and
having to undertake less than full obligations. That side of the outcome is a shambles."
Id.; see also infra "Differentiation of Obligations."
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nothing happens in the WTO.' ' 34 1 Stoler's chief regret is to have
"wrecked what had been a pretty good system in the GATT years."34 2
At the very least, the new lawmaking framework in the WTO is
markedly less hospitable to the club dynamics that flourished under
the GATT. The only area in which this dynamic is still squarely at
play in the WTO context is in accession negotiations, including
accessions to the single functioning plurilateral agreement in the
WTO framework, the Agreement on Government Procurement
(section 1).
In regular negotiations, WTO members have developed
negotiating techniques that superficially resemble the club approach
in the sense that they allow the bulk of the negotiations to occur
among relatively small groups of countries, thereby reducing the
complexity of the negotiations and giving these countries a
disproportionate influence on the outcome. Procedurally this is
accomplished through negotiations in "variable geometry" (section 2).
In terms of substance, it is made possible by exempting large swaths
of the membership from new legal commitments, leading to an ever
more sophisticated differentiation of obligations (section 3). In
contrast to the times of the GATT, however, this internalized club is
constrained: procedurally, by transparency and reporting procedures
that have been put in place, and, substantively, by the need to keep
other WTO members, who can now block an outcome that they
perceive as unfavorable, on board. As a result, the pace of lawmaking
in the multilateral trading system is now circumscribed by the need
to seek the support, or at least acquiescence, of all WTO members-as
this Article has demonstrated, this had never been the case in the
GATT.
1. Accession Negotiations
Accession negotiations provide a unique opportunity for WTO
members to realize the third element of the club approach: make
outsiders join their agreement(s) on the insiders' terms. Except in the
case of LDCs, there are virtually no limits to what a WTO member
can demand from an acceding country. Participants in the accession
process have described its first stage-the examination of the
conformity of the acceding country's trade regime with WTO rules-
as "akin to having a complainant at a panel act as the sole
panellist.' ' 3 43 The second stage of the accession process involves
bilateral negotiations between the acceding country and interested
WTO members. The key difference between these negotiations and
341. Stoler Correspondence, supra note 321, at 2.
342. Id.
343. Roman Grynberg & Roy Mickey Joy, The Accession of Vanuatu to the WTO:
Lessons for the Multilateral Trading System, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 159, 159 (2000).
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the general lawmaking process in the WTO is that accession
negotiations offer "the applicant no possibility of imposing a marginal
cost on the demandeur."3 44 Roman Grynberg and Roy Mickey Joy,
who worked on the accession of Vanuatu to the WTO, have described
implications of this constellation:
Without any right or ability to impose costs on a demandeur negotiations must
continue until the WTO members are satisfied that no further concessions are
possible. Thus, irrespective of the size of the applicant, the bilateral
negotiations will be protracted unless the applicant quickly concedes the vast
bulk of the standardized demands of the large WTO members.
34 5
The accession process thus allows WTO members to impose their
terms on an acceding country-a paradigmatic instantiation of the
third element of the club approach.
2. Variable Geometry
The question of "who gets to be in the room" did not cease to be
an issue in the WTO. To the contrary, in the first years of the
existence of the WTO, there was considerable apprehension that the
GATT practice of the major trading powers reaching agreement
among themselves and presenting it to the rest of the membership as
a fait accompli would continue-in other words, that the club
dynamic of the GATT would survive. These concerns acquired new
urgency after the collapse of the Seattle ministerial meeting, which
was supposed to launch a new round of trade negotiations. While the
meeting was wildly seen as having failed due to inadequate
preparation and substantive disagreements,346 it had featured the
same exclusionary dynamics that were known from the GATT
days.3 47 In the wake of Seattle, WTO members began to discuss what
came to be known as the agenda item of "internal transparency and
effective participation of all members" in the WTO's General Council.
The basic thrust of these discussions was that, while informal
344. Id. at 160 (emphasis in original).
345. Id.
346. See World Trade Organization, General Council Minutes of 7-8 February
2000, WTO Doc. WT/GCIM/53 (2000) 44 (reporting the statement of the Director-
General, "[w]hile he believed most would agree that major issues of substance had
played a greater role than process in preventing agreement in Seattle, getting the
process right was important."); see also World Trade Organization, Internal
Transparency and Effective Participation of all Members: Main Points Raised by
Delegations, WTO Doc. JOB(00)/2331 (Apr. 14, 2000), at 3 [hereinafter Transparency
Main Points] (providing the views of WTO members on this issue).
347. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 269-70 (citing a complaint by the Indian
delegation that "only about thirty countries were authorized to participate in the
WTO's consultative process in Seattle at the end of November 1999"; the process
'eliminated 100-plus countries from any participation at all, and some could not even
enter the premises' where the negotiations were taking place.").
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consultations between smaller groups of members were useful and,
given the large membership of the WTO, essential to build a
consensus, the transparency of these consultations had to be
increased, the nonparticipating members had to be informed about
developments in these consultations on a regular basis, and all
decision-making power had to be effectively reserved to forums in
which the entire membership participated. As India put it at the
time, if these conditions are met, the "green room meetings will by
and large get de-glamorised.
' 348
By most accounts, the consultations on internal transparency
and effective participation in 2000 and 2002 quickly yielded
substantial improvements in terms of making WTO negotiations
more inclusive.3 49 The chairmen of WTO negotiating groups openly
embrace negotiations in "variable geometry" 350 or "concentric
circles"35 1 and by and large have taken their reporting commitments
seriously. The procedural safeguards that crystallized in the
consultations are reflected in how the WTO defines the terms
"transparent" 352 and "inclusive" 353 for the purposes of WTO
negotiations.
348. Transparency Main Points, supra note 346, at 14.
349. See e.g., World Trade Organization, General Council Minutes of 18 October
2000, WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/59 (2000), 23 (noting that the Hong Kong representative
said of the issue, "[t]he process had been effective, and was a successful example of the
improvements made in terms of internal transparency."). For a skeptical view, see
FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL
WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2004).
350. References to this concept in Chairs' reports are common. See e.g., World
Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Development, Forty-Sixth Special
Session, Note on the Meeting of 20 March 2012, TN/CTD/MI46 (Jun. 26, 2012) at 6
("While such engagement in variable geometry was intended to help advance the work
pragmatically, he wished to stress that his door remained open to any delegation that
wished either to get an update on the progress of the work, or that wished to contribute
an input to advance the work.").
351. Glossary, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https:/Iwww.wto.org/englisl
thewtoe/glossarye/glossary-e.htm [https://perma.cc/Q3R5-73BX (archived Oct. 1,
2015) (defining "concentric circles" as "a system of small and large, informal and formal
meetings handled by the chairperson, who is at the centre. The outer 'circle' is the
formal meeting of the full membership, where decisions are taken and statements are
recorded in official minutes or notes. Inside, the circles represent informal meetings of
the full membership or smaller groups of members, down to bilateral consultations
with the chair. Members accept he process as they all have input and information is
shared.").
352. Id. (defining "transparent" as "sharing information, in this case so all
members know what is happening in smaller group meetings. In WTO negotiations and
other decision-making, ideas are tested and issues are discussed in a variety of
meetings, many of them with only some members present. Members approve of this
process so long as information is shared. They also want the process to ensure they can
have input into it ('inclusive'). The final decision can only be taken by a formal meeting
of the full membership.").
353. Id. (defining "inclusive" as "ensuring all members have input into a process
even when meetings involve only some of them. In WTO negotiations and other
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At the same time, anything that smacks of a fall back into the
club dynamic of the GATT era has been met with a rather furious
backlash. Thus, in the run-up to the Cancdin ministerial in 2003, the
United States and the European Union presented a joint proposal on
agriculture that was less ambitious than most developing countries
and agricultural exporters had hoped, most notably in continuing to
allow agricultural export subsidies.3 54 With the conclusion of the
agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round still fresh in their
minds, the major developing countries coalesced in a new coalition,
the G20, to resist the proposal. At the Cancdin ministerial itself, the
United States managed to have its response to a proposal for the
expeditious reduction of subsidies on cotton inserted in the draft
ministerial declaration, contributing to the collapse of the meeting.
355
In the subsequent negotiations, the United States and the European
Union had to abandon their positions on both subjects; the next
ministerial declaration envisaged the abolition of agricultural export
subsidies by 2013 and contained an expeditious schedule for the
reduction and abolition of subsidies on cotton.
356
In sum, participation in negotiations still has elements of the
club approach. Small group meetings serve to make it easier to reach
agreement. Moreover, the major trading nations are present and
active in all small group meetings, which will translate into a
disproportionate impact on the outcome of the negotiations. At the
same time, their control of the negotiations has become much more
tenuous, and their ability to force others to join their agreement is
greatly diminished. Other WTO members are now much better
informed of the progress of the negotiations and are effectively able to
insert themselves into the negotiations and to block agreement
whenever they want to. Moreover, the number of major players has
increased, and the United States and the European Union now share
the stage with a number of other major participants, in particular
India, Brazil, and China.
decision-making, ideas are tested and issues are discussed in a variety of meetings,
many of them with only some members present. Members approve of this process so
long as information is shared and they have input into it either by being present or
being represented by a group coordinator. The final decision can only be taken by a
formal meeting of the full membership.").
354. See PAUL BLUSTEIN, MISADVENTURES OF THE MOST FAVOURED NATIONS:
CLASHING EGOS, INFLATED AMBITIONS, AND THE GREAT SHAMBLES OF THE WORLD
TRADE SYSTEM 141-44 (2009).
355. World Trade Organization, Preparations for the Fifth Session of the
Ministerial Conference, Draft Cancdin Ministerial Text, Second Revision, WTO Dc.
JOB(03)/150/Rev.2 (Sept. 13, 2003), 27.
356. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005,
WTO Doc. WTIMIN(05)/DEC (2005), 6, 11 ("We agree to ensure the parallel
elimination of all forms of export subsidies and isciplines on all export measures with
equivalent effect to be completed by the end of 2013 .... All forms of export subsidies
for cotton will be eliminated by developed countries in 2006.").
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3. Differentiation of Obligations
WTO members have attempted to take advantage of the first two
benefits of the club approach in WTO lawmaking by accepting an
increased differentiation of obligations in the trading system. This
increased differentiation has taken two forms.
First, negotiating modalities, such as the modalities on
agriculture and non-agricultural market access in the current Doha
Round negotiations, now contain highly differentiated rules for the
undertaking of commitments.357 At least in part, this differentiation
reflects an attempt to reduce the complexity of trade negotiations.
Thus, the agriculture modalities envisage very shallow commitments
for large groups of members, most of which have very small shares in
agricultural trade. Reportedly, these members were exempted from
meaningful reduction commitments in part to allow the negotiations
on the modalities to take place among the relatively few countries
with substantial trade volumes. 358 The differentiation of
commitments in negotiating modalities has thus in part been
motivated by the first benefit of the club approach: the greater
practicality of negotiating among a smaller group.
Second, some WTO members have chosen to take on additional
commitments, for example with respect to market access for
information technology products359 and with respect to the regulation
357. The Doha Round of trade negotiations was launched at a Ministerial
Meeting in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. The so-called "modalities" are documents
reflecting the current state of the negotiations. The modalities contain formulas that
will determine the scope of new market access commitments that WTO Members will
be required to undertake once the Doha Round is concluded. The current version of the
draft modalities stems from December 2008; WTO Members have been unable to agree
to amend the draft modalities ever since, and there is virtually no prospect that they
will be adopted in their current form. See Negotiating Group on Market Access, Fourth
Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, WTO Doc.
TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (Dec. 6, 2008); Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture, WTO Doc. TN/AGIW/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008).
358. Interview with Joseph Glauber, in Washington, D.C. (Apr.-May 2010)
(explaining that the chairman of the negotiations would simply ask the negotiating
group whether anyone would mind if he exempted, say, the least-developed countries
(LDCs) or the small vulnerable economies (SVEs) from a particular reduction
commitment; because of the small trade volumes involved, nobody would object, and
the group would be exempted; as a result, many of the key reduction commitments in
the agriculture modalities would ultimately only apply to a relatively small group of
countries with significant trade volumes, and negotiations would thus mainly occur
among those countries).
359. See WTO Secretariat, 15 Years of the Information Technology Agreement:
Trade, Innovation and Global Production Networks (2012), http://www.wto.org/
english/res-e/publicationse/ital5years_2012fulle.pdf [https://perma.cc/569Y-3RQW]
(archived Oct. 1, 2015) (discussing the Information Technology Agreement).
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of telecommunications markets,3 60 on a critical mass basis. In order
to be able to assume these commitments without having to seek the
permission of nonparticipating countries, the participants in critical
mass lawmaking have inscribed their additional commitments in
their GATT and GATS schedules, instead of embodying them in an
amendment to those agreements 361 or in a new plurilateral
agreement.362 The route via schedules allowed the critical mass
countries to realize the first two benefits of the club approach: they
could negotiate among themselves and did not have to pay attention
to the interests of outsiders. At the same time, however, scheduled
commitments have to be implemented on an MFN basis. In other
words, the scheduling option does not allow the critical mass
countries to exclude nonparticipants from the benefits that the latter
might derive from the additional commitments, as an amendment or
a new plurilateral agreement might have done. Again, the insiders
thus have little leverage to force outsiders to join their agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article shows how the multilateral trading system used to
work as a club. Despite the ambition to universality that marked the
United States' push for an ITO, the developed countries early on
began to see participation in multilateral trade lawmaking as a club
good. Three factors prompted them to take this perspective: (1) the
greater practicality of negotiating among a smaller group of
countries, (2) the ability of the insiders to shape the content of the
agreement decisively, and (3) the prospect that they might
subsequently be able to force outsiders to join the agreement on the
insiders' terms.
While the club approach holds many attractions for the insiders
and has been employed for a number of reasons, this Article has
drawn particular attention to how the major developed countries have
used it to establish and defend the principle of reciprocity as the basis
for multilateral trade lawmaking. The relationship between the club
360. For discussion of the Reference Paper on basic telecommunications, see
LANG, supra note 109, at 284-90, and World Trade Organization, Communication from
the United States: Scheduling Regulatory Principles, S/NGBTIW/18 (Jan. 23, 1996).
361. This would have required the support of at least a two-thirds majority of
WTO members. See Marrakesh Agreement art. X:1 ("If consensus is not reached at a
meeting of the Ministerial Conference within the established period, the Ministerial
Conference shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the Members whether to submit the
proposed amendment o the Members for acceptance.").
362. This would have required a consensus decision by the WTO membership.
See Marrakesh Agreement art. X:9 ("The Ministerial Conference, upon the request of
the Members parties to a trade agreement, may decide exclusively by consensus to add
that agreement o Annex 4.").
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approach and the principle of reciprocity is one of mutual
reinforcement. The desire to enforce the principle of reciprocity has
often been the chief motivation for adopting the club approach to
lawmaking in the trading system. As is argued above, the club
approach was pioneered not only to make bilateral request-and-offer
negotiations practicable, but also to allow the "nuclear" countries to
deny the benefits of the tariff concessions that they had granted each
other to any ITO member that did not engage in tariff negotiations to
the satisfaction of the nuclear countries. Similarly, the exclusionary
negotiating arrangements adopted in the Kennedy Round tariff
negotiations were in large part adopted to entice developing countries
to make an appropriate "contribution" to the negotiations. Thus, any
country that had not been recognized as a "full participant" in the
negotiations on the basis of its compliance with the reciprocity norm
was not allowed to see the list of products that the developed
countries were planning to exempt from their horizontal tariff cut;
such a country was thus unable to protest against he exemption of
products of export interest to it. In the Tokyo Round, the developed
countries' strategy to include the conditional MFN principle in the
new codes on non-tariff barriers, although only partially successful,
was similarly designed to force nonsignatories to pay for the benefits
of the codes. And finally, the Uruguay Round single undertaking and
the establishment of the WTO were embraced by the Quad countries,
and the United States in particular, as "an opportunity not to be
missed to rid the new system once and for all of free riders."363 The
prominence of the club approach in multilateral trade lawmaking is
thus in large part explained by the desire to enforce the principle of
reciprocity.
Finally, the Article shows that the founding of the WTO, while
itself an example of the successful employment of the club dynamic,
has made the use of the club approach in the multilateral trading
system much more difficult, if not impracticable. In a way, the WTO
was the club to end all clubs. As a result, it has become much more
difficult for a subset of members to assume more ambitious
obligations in the framework of the multilateral trading system. At
the very least, the new lawmaking framework is markedly less
hospitable to the club dynamics that flourished under the GATT.
363. Stoler, supra note 304, at 4.
